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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Privatisation has become one of the most powerful strategies imple-
mented by policy-makers all over the world to improve the perform-
ance of enterprises. This course of action has a very good theoretical
background. Many theories have been developed as to why private
firms should outperform state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Some of
them are strongly supported by empirical studies carried out in differ-
ent countries all over the world.
At the same time, privatisation in Russia, the largest example in
world history, seemed to have the most ambiguous results. There are
even views that privatisation in Russia has turned out to be a great
failure. However, there is a lack of statistically significant evidence on
the matter, and there are only few studies where the impacts of privati-
sation and transition are carefully separated.
We aim to check empirically the hypothesis that privatisation in
Russia also promotes performance improvements, but these improve-
ments are attenuated by the negative influence of the processes of
transition. Basing our approach upon various theoretical and empirical
studies, we analyse whether privatisation has a positive impact upon a
firm's ability to generate revenue growth and upon the level of work-
ers' wages, whether it leads to increases in profitability and improve-
ments in operating efficiency, and whether it causes reductions in em-
ployment.
We use fixed and random effects models for our panel data of 198
medium, large and extra-large industrial enterprises in the Sverdlovsk
Oblast during 1992-1996. The panel covers all the main industries in
one of the most developed regions of Russia. The majority of the en-
terprises were privatised during this period. It helps us to compare the
results of SOE and privatised enterprises, as well as the performance
of the same enterprise before and after privatisation. We separated out
the effects of ownership change from the influence of transition, in-
dustry affiliation, size of firm and competition that could seriously dis-
tort the results.
The study offers several main conclusions.
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First, transition is the major determinant of industrial performance
in the region, and its negative influence only strengthens during the
period under analysis.
Second, privatisation "on average" produces decent improve-
ments only in operating profit margin (costs per unit of revenues) and,
to a lesser extent, in the productivity of labour. We failed to find any
influence of privatisation "on average" on the total profitability of busi-
nesses, revenue growth, employment, and the level of workers' wages.
Third, we reveal that some options of privatisation have led to
better performance and some, the reverse. It means that privatisation
in Russia is heterogeneous; that is why it is almost useless to analyse
its effect "on average". We find that enterprises privatised by option 2,
the lease of assets without buy-out and the privatisation of the residual
state share by option 2 or by lease/buy-out, show better performance
results. Option 1 causes a decrease in sales and reductions in em-
ployment and seems to be the worst of the privatisation methods. At
the same time, we failed to find any influence of the methods of priva-
tisation on the level of workers' wages.
Fourth, we showed that the date of the approval of the privatisa-
tion plan was as important for performance results as the state share-
holding because, from this date, the enterprise officially leaves the
state management. The state seems to be a passive shareholder.
However, when the state has majority (or, though worse, blocking)
control, it is preferable to a state minority stakeholding, possibly be-
cause of the absence of a monitoring shareholder in the latter case to
prevent managers from achieving their own objectives at the expense
of the other shareholders. That is why the state should keep majority
control over privatised enterprises or else diminish its stake below 5%
in order to avoid a negative drop in revenue growth, employment and
profit margin caused by the absence of a monitoring shareholder.
We found also that the corporatisation of a state-owned enter-
prise, i.e. its transformation into a joint stock company with 100% state
ownership, was not worse than its privatisation and even better than
the case with a state share between 5 and 51%. In order to have im-
provements in the effectiveness of state-owned enterprises, the state
could corporatise even some of the enterprises which are now prohib-
ited from being privatised, while preserving 100% of the shares in state
ownership because the mere fact of privatisation is important.
6 Analysis of the Impact of Privatisation on the Industrial Enterprises
Fifth, we did not find any evidence that the size of a firm played
any role in its performance results. At the same time, competition in
industry increases costs per unit of revenue and decreases labour
productivity. The latter contradicts the common point of view on the
role of competition. In our opinion, the main reason for this is the
domination of the effects of demand elasticity by the effects of de-
mand reduction which does not stimulate managerial efforts. We found
also significant differences in adjustment across industrial sectors.
Finally, we find that selection bias seems to exist in our sample,
but it is a negative selection bias — it is not the better enterprises that
are chosen for privatisation, but the worse ones — which obviously only
handicaps the impact of privatisation. The negative dynamics of a
firm's performance before privatisation is usually considered as the
consequence of a desire of managers to force employees into privati-
sation or to lower the price of the enterprise in order to buy it more
cheaply. We argue, however, that bad performance is due to the disin-
tegration of the planned communist system, the disruption of previous
production links, and the transition to the market economy. Under
conditions of worsening performance results, privatisation seemed to
managers and employees as the only possibility for improving the
situation.
1. Introduction 7
1. INTRODUCTION
Privatisation is one of the most important elements of transition in
Russia. In 1992, Russia entered the club of numerous countries all
over the world that, in the last decade, has launched ambitious privati-
sation programmes. More than 15,000 state-owned enterprises, at a
conservative estimate, were privatised across the world between 1980–
1992, most of them since 1990 (Kikeri et al, 1994). However, the num-
ber of privatised enterprises in Russia is higher than in all the other
countries of the world put together. Moreover, in contradiction with
other countries, where privatisation, as a rule, has realised its targets,
the results of privatisation in Russia seem to be ambiguous. It is a
widespread opinion that privatisation in this country has turned out to
be a great failure.
At the same time, there is a lack of statistically-significant evi-
dence on the matter. Most of the studies in Russia do not have a suf-
ficient period of post-privatisation and are based on surveys made in a
fixed year. In the absence of time-series data, it is hard to find any
clear evidence of the effect of privatisation. It is especially hard in
conditions of the extremely volatile transition processes that are taking
place in Russia. However, now "the dust has settled", we can look for
the systematic effects of privatisation.
Privatisation in Russia had many proclaimed targets, from the
formation of private property to the attraction of foreign investment.1
This work is concerned with a crucial issue of privatisation: its influence
upon industrial enterprise performance. It is well-known that economic
reasons stood behind the reform in Russia, and it is widely believed
that privatisation would considerably improve the efficiency of enter-
prises. Improvement of enterprise performance was one of the main
targets of privatisation in Russia. Was the target realised? What was
                                               
1 The targets of the Russian privatisation programme are quite similar to the
targets of privatisation in other countries. For example, in the United Kingdom
they are as follows: (1) raise revenue for the state; (2) promote increased effi-
ciency; (3) reduce government interference in the economy; (4) promote wider
share ownership; (5) provide the opportunity to introduce competition; and (6)
expose SOEs to market discipline (Megginson et al, 1994).
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the real impact of privatisation upon enterprise performance in Russia?
How can this impact be measured?
Trying to answer the questions, we analyse panel data for 198 in-
dustrial enterprises in the Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is one of the most
industrialised regions in Russia, during 1992–1996. The panel data in-
cludes medium, large and extra-large enterprises in almost all the in-
dustries of the region. The majority of the enterprises were privatised
in the analysed period, and this facilitates a comparison of the per-
formance of state-owned and privatised enterprises, as well as the
performance of enterprises before and after privatisation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we re-
view theoretical views on the engines of performance improvements
after privatisation, the empirical evidence on the issue from different
countries, and the methods used. We also analyse the problem of se-
lection bias that can seriously distort the results. Section 3 reports the
objective of our study, the basic hypotheses that are checked, and the
models used. Section 4 focuses on the description of our sample. In
Section 5, the main results of the study are presented, including the
average effects of privatisation, the effect of different options for it and
the impact on a firm's performance of the state's stake in ownership
and equity. In Section 6, we discuss the results and the validity of the
research hypotheses. In Section 7, the existence of the problem of
selection bias in our sample is analysed. Finally, Section 8 contains
some conclusions for the adjustment of privatisation policy. The Ap-
pendices provide a detailed description of the sample (Appendix B),
regression variables (Appendix A), and regression statistics
(Appendix C).
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
AND AN OUTLINE OF ITS INVESTIGATION
2.1. Theoretical background
Governments attempt to privatise state-owned enterprises for various
reasons: in order to raise revenue; to create popular capitalism; to re-
ward political loyalists; to placate the demands or suggestions of ex-
ternal financing agents; to decrease the administrative burden of state
bureaucracy; and to make the private sector responsible for necessary
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enterprise investments (Nellis, 1991). However, the primary reason is
to improve the efficiency of SOEs and, as a result, to reduce the
budgetary burden on the state. In Russia, the improvement of enter-
prise performance was the second privatisation objective of significant
importance determined by the State Programme of Privatisation of
State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992. In
the Fundamentals of the State Privatisation Programme after 1 July
1994, it became the highest priority objective.
There are different theoretical views why state-owned enterprises
are less effective than private ones.
Shapiro and Willig (1990) regard state-owned enterprises as in-
struments capable of curing market failures by implementing pricing
policies that take account of social marginal costs (the social view).
It should be added that SOEs in former socialist countries usually
played an important social role as providers of numerous social func-
tions and services: housing; medical care; recreation facilities; and so
on. These functions and expenses also negatively influenced the per-
formance effectiveness of SOEs.
However, contra arguments can be adduced. In socialist coun-
tries, wages were strictly limited and not very differentiated. Under
these conditions, additional social functions and services could be
considered initiatives for more effective activity. These functions and
services could also have a stimulating character in the transition pe-
riod, when many of them require payment, but employees of enter-
prises with a developed social sphere can use them free of charge.
Private firms should be less subject to political interference
(the political view). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1994), politi-
cal interference in the firm results in excessive employment, poor
choices of product and location, lack of investment and ill-defined
incentives for managers. SOEs may be more susceptible to pres-
sure from interest groups, while private firms can focus solely on
maximising profits; and private investors generally have a long-term
horizon when they acquire assets which can be sold, whereas the
electoral assets enjoyed by politicians tend to be more fleeting and
short-lived (Phelps, 1992).
Contra arguments are that, in the absence of the necessary insti-
tutions, private owners are not interested in keeping firms' assets in
good condition in the long-run, nor are they able to (Nellis, 1999).
Their interests become short-term and speculative. Then, political
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interference turns out to be long-term and more preferable for the
improvement of firms' performance.
Privatisation leads to better incentives (the incentive view). Vickers
and Yarrow (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) argue that managers of SOEs
may lack high-powered incentives or may not be properly monitored.
The residual cash flow claims of SOEs are not readily transferable like
the shares of a private corporation. This impairs residual claimant in-
centives to monitor managers and, ultimately, degrades firm perform-
ance (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1998). Supervision by governments
tends to be bureaucratic, rigid and more interested in seeing that
regulations have been followed rather than that opportunities have
been seized (Nellis, 1991). Under public ownership, the government
retains unconditional control over the use of the assets of the firm. It
encourages rent-seeking behaviour by firm insiders. A government is
vulnerable to political pressure to maintain established rents (high
wages/low effort, high and secure employment, etc.); and it leads to a
loss of incentives (Perotti and Guney, 1993). Private firms are super-
vised by self-interested shareholders. Private owners have stronger
incentives to maximise profits than do government appointees, be-
cause they own equity and so bear the financial consequences of their
decisions. Private firms are also more capable of offering decent in-
centives and salaries to managers (Barberis et al, 1996). Private firms
may find it more difficult to get public assistance; therefore, the penalty
for failing to maximise profits is harsher, and perhaps the fruits of suc-
cess are also sweeter (Phelps, 1992).
Contra arguments are that, according to agency theory and the
free-rider problem, the government is the blockholder in SOEs and can
monitor the managers of state-owned enterprises more intensely than
shareholders in diffusely-held private corporations can monitor their
managers (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1998). It should be added that, in
the period of ownership changes, managers could get out of control. In
the conditions of the absence of an adequate legal base, legal nihilism
and total corruption, new owners and managers could be interested only
in quick enrichment. New owners receive ex-state equity very cheaply,
and they can have stronger initiatives not to maximise profit but to con-
vert the equity into a liquid form and privatise it completely by transfer-
ring it to the accounts of foreign banks or in other ways.
Private owners choose the best managers to run their firm effi-
ciently (the human capital view). Managers of state firms are selected
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for their ability to get along with politicians, address political concern
and lobby for assistance. In contrast, managers of private firms are
selected for their ability to run firms efficiently (Barberis et al, 1996).
SOEs may be pressed to hire politically-connected people rather than
those best qualified to perform the desired tasks (Krueger, 1990).
Contra arguments are that, if the new owners are interested not in
performance improvements but in quick enrichment, they will select
the appropriate managers.
On the other hand, neo-classical economic theory suggests
that the relationship between ownership and performance is tenu-
ous. Efficiency is viewed as determined more by market structure
and the degree of competition than by who owns the assets (Nellis,
1991). Competition generates an efficient allocation of resources,
reduces managerial slack and stimulates managerial and worker
efforts, and leads to cost-reducing investment or quality-improving
expenditure (Koning, 1997). As a result of competition, greater op-
portunities for the comparison of performance, the responsiveness
of performance to managerial efforts and the probability of bank-
ruptcy generate sharper incentives for managers (a thorough re-
view of the theoretical basis for the belief that competition drives
forward productivity improvements is presented in Nickell, 1996). A
firm's ownership structure is subject to market pressure, so that, in
the long-run, each firm that is capable of surviving competition will
end up with an ownership structure that is essentially close to the
optimal (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
However, privatisation strengthens competition, which enforces
the efficiency of the firm (the competition view). As Kikeri et al (1994)
stress, over-extended and poorly-performing SOEs have slowed the
growth of the private sector (and the increase in competition). Gov-
ernment often blocks the entry of private firms that would compete
with SOEs; government credits to capital-intensive SOEs often crowd
private firms out of credit markets; bankers tend to assume that there
is an implicit government guarantee for credits to SOEs — a perception
leading to the disadvantage of the private sector; and the inefficient
provision of critical inputs by badly-managed public utilities increases
the costs of business to private firms and limits the potential for their
expansion. Private enterprises should be more subject to the discipline
of commercial financial markets than SOEs, because SOEs operate on
Kornai's famous "soft budget constraint" (Barberis et al, 1996): they
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often obtain capital at less than the market rate of interest and enjoy
subsidies from the state.
However, the arguments for the competition view are only valid if
private firms are indeed more effective than state-owned ones, but the
latter is not obvious.
That is why, from a theoretical standpoint, it is not clear that
ownership form by itself determines relative profitability or efficiency.
2.2. Empirical background
Several studies were carried out in industrial and developing countries
in order to check empirically the impact of privatisation. Studies under-
taken in industrial economies largely attributed the superior efficiency
of private as opposed to public firms to market structure rather than to
ownership, while the few studies of developing countries revealed
marginal efficiency differences between public and private firms (Kikeri
et al, 1994). More recent studies by Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogel-
sang (1994) in Britain, Chile, Malaysia and Mexico; by Megginson,
Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) in Austria, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Chile and 13 other countries; and by La Porta and Lopez-de-
Silanes (1997) in Mexico, showed the considerable economic benefits
from privatisation of SOEs. On the basis of a sample of 500 companies
in more than 32 countries, Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) present
empirical evidence that state-owned firms are less efficient than private
firms. At the same time, for the sub-sample of 63 privatised firms, they
find little evidence that privatisation itself raises firm performance
(except for a few indicators).
A number of studies have been made on privatisation in transition
economies. As Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1997) point
out, the post-communist transition environment, ripe with transition
shocks and characterised by far from equilibrium conditions, offers a
unique testing ground for hypotheses concerning the role of ownership
in corporate behaviour and performance.
Research in Poland by Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) showed that pri-
vatised firms invested more and had greater capacity to ensure higher
output growth. Frydman et al (1997, 1998) found that private owner-
ship dramatically improved corporate revenue performance in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, but there is no comparable ef-
fect of ownership change on cost reduction. A comprehensive analysis
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by Anderson, Djankov, Pohl and Claessens (1997) of the privatisation
of more than 6,000 industrial firms in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia showed
that privatised firms achieved higher labour productivity growth and
growth in total factor productivity than did state-owned firms. At the
same time, Konings (1997) claims that there is little or no difference in
performance for privatised and state-owned enterprises in Slovenia,
Hungary and Romania.
Earle and Estrin (1996) present empirical evidence that privatisa-
tion in Russia did have an impact on enterprise efficiency, but domes-
tic market structure and the hardening of the budget constraints
mostly had little effect. Later, they found systematic effects of private
ownership on several types of restructuring behaviour and on labour
productivity (Earle and Estrin, 1997). A comparative analysis of the
economic performance of more than 2,000 Russian state-owned and
privatised enterprises carried out by experts in Saint-Petersburg and
Moscow showed that private enterprises were ahead of state-owned
ones on basic economic indicators (Êîõ et al, 1997). The difference
was more significant for the effectiveness of production and less for
the financial indicators.
Perevalov et al (Ïåðåâàëîâ et al, 1998a, 1998b) analysed industrial
enterprises in the Sverdlovsk Region of Russia and showed a positive
influence of privatisation upon their performance, although this influ-
ence was hidden by the negative processes of transition.
At the same time, according to a large research programme in
Russia by the World Bank, ownership changes are generally weakly
associated with most indicators of performance, including sales, wages
and employment (Commander et al, 1996). Finally, Nellis (1999) comes
to the conclusion that, the farther east one travels, the less has privati-
sation improved firms' performance, and the first and largest disap-
pointment is Russian privatisation.
Therefore, the results are rather contradictory, probably because
of selection bias and differences in the methodology applied.
2.3. Selection bias
In all the above-cited examples of empirical studies, privatisation is
considered exogenously determined. However, we do not know what
were the real reasons for the privatisation of the concrete enterprise.
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For example, state ownership could be preserved to shore-up firms
that are not competitive in the market, or better firms could be chosen
for privatisation. Thus, treating privatisation as exogenous can confuse
the direction of causality. If the performance results of an enterprise
determine the decision to privatise it, then the assumption that privati-
sation affects performance leads to a misinterpretation of the relation-
ship and to incorrect privatisation decisions.
As Megginson et al (1994) and Dewenter and Malatesta (1998)
point out, many empirical studies comparing government and private
firms use very small or rather specialised samples. Indeed, Caves and
Christensen (1980) examine Canadian railroads; Atkinson and Hal-
vorsen (1986) study electric utilities; and Eckel, Eckel and Singal
(1997) look at British Airways. The performance comparison reported
by Martin and Parker (1995) is based on a sample of 11 firms. Kole
and Mulherin (1997) examine five, while Perevalov et al (Ïåðåâàëîâ
et al, 1998a, 1998b) consider 24. These studies lack statistical signifi-
cance and are subject to selection bias. The studies of regulated firms
could be considered invalid because of the absence of competitive
markets.
In Russia, on the one hand, employees themselves have had to
come to privatisation decisions, including a choice of the option of the
privileges to be used. It is supposed that insiders are better informed
of the true value of an enterprise, and this informational asymmetry
could lead to selection bias. On the other hand, the absence of a de-
veloped stock market in Russia makes a real evaluation of a firm very
problematic, almost impossible, especially by insiders. Moreover, Rus-
sian privatisation was a large-scale and very quick campaign. Accord-
ing to the Decree of the President of Russia No 721 of 1 July 1992, the
majority of large and largest enterprises having over 1,000 employees
and over 50 million rubles of fixed assets had to be, and were, priva-
tised at the end of 1992-beginning of 1993. Moreover, if employees
had not come to a decision by the set date, the enterprise would be
compulsorily privatised. If in the world more than 15,000 state-owned
enterprises were privatised from 1980–1992 (Kikeri et al, 1994), in
Russia their number is more than 80,000 and most were privatised in
1992–1995. This seems to be a kind of a guarantee against selec-
tion bias.
However, the absence of selection bias in Russian privatisation is
arguable and needs thorough consideration. Besides, selection bias
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can take place in the process of the selection of a sample for study.
For example, in some studies a sample is restricted to medium-sized
firms, because "privatisation of the industrial 'dinosaurs' of the com-
munist era raises special political and social problems" (Frydman et al,
1997). It reduces the usefulness of the conclusions, because large
enterprises dominate Russian industry.
2.4. Methodology
There are two main approaches to an evaluation of the impact of priva-
tisation on enterprise performance: the "synchronic" approach and the
"historical" one (Frydman et al, 1997).
The "synchronic" approach is based on a comparison of the per-
formance of state and private (or privatised) firms. Boardman and Vin-
ing (1989), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997), Commander et al
(1996), the experts of Saint Petersburg and Moscow (Êîõ et al, 1997),
Anderson et al (1997), Earl and Estrin (1997), Perevalov et al
(Ïåðåâàëîâ et al, 1998a, 1998b), Dewenter and Malatesta (1998), and
many others, use the approach in their studies.2
In the "synchronic" approach, it is supposed that the compared
firms work under the same conditions: at the same time, in the same
markets, and within the same environment. Nevertheless, it is practi-
cally impossible to find two identical enterprises, for example in metal-
lurgy, especially if one of the two has to be a state-owned enterprise
and the other a private one. There are always differences in capacity,
equipment and in supply, every enterprise operates in its own eco-
nomic, political and social environment, and every enterprise is at its
own stage in the life cycle. There are also territorial differences, includ-
ing differences in transition processes which are especially relevant for
Russia, differences in management, and so on.
From this point of view, it seems to be more reasonable to
compare the ex ante and ex post privatisation performance of the
same enterprise, as the "historical" approach does. This approach
was used, for example, by Megginson et al (1994), Earle and Estrin
(1997), Perevalov et al (Ïåðåâàëîâ et al, 1998a, 1998b), Dewenter
and Malatesta (1998), and by some other scientists (see Frydman
et al, 1997).
                                               
2 See Frydman et al (1997) for a summary of the literature.
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At the same time, this approach is too straightforward. It permits
only the measuring of changes in enterprise performance after privati-
sation, but fails to isolate the privatisation benefits from the impact of
the other factors that have also influenced the performance results.
For example, Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) show that the perform-
ance improvements after privatisation observed by Megginson et al
(1994) reflect ordinary fluctuations related to the business cycle. The
situation in Russia is redoubled by the fact that other complex transi-
tion processes, such as price liberalisation, the liquidation of the state
system of planning and control, the commercialisation of the banking
system and so on, have taken place since 1992 alongside privatisation
and have distorted its effects. All these years, Russian enterprises have
been operating under the conditions of economic crisis, with huge in-
flation, a slump in demand, inability to pay, the tax burden, and a lack
of working capital. That is why it is rather difficult to isolate the real
effects of privatisation.
A reliable study of the impact of privatisation on performance, as
Frydman et al (1997) state, must combine the two approaches.
Frydman et al compare state and private firms operating at the same
time but use historical data in addition to synchronic comparisons in
order to eliminate the possibility of selection bias. To establish that
pre-privatisation selection bias does not affect post-privatisation re-
sults, they evaluate the pre-privatisation performance of privatised
firms relative to state firms and show that, originally, they did not differ
significantly from each other. However, in our opinion, it is not enough
to compare the excess of revenues over labour and material costs in
privatised and state firms in order to eliminate the possibility of selec-
tion bias because the compared firms can have, for example, different
specialisations. It was of no importance in the administrative-command
system before the reform, but specialisation can be very much the re-
sult in transition economies when the demand structure has dramati-
cally changed. In the presence of selection bias, the model they used
fails to produce consistent estimates of the effects of privatisation.
More appropriate is a later work by the same authors (Frydman et
al, 1998), where a standard evaluation procedure for panel data treat-
ment is used. As they remark, the fixed effects estimator used in the
paper controls for the selection bias that creates a dependence be-
tween group-specific characteristics and the effects of privatisation.
It is true on the assumption that the unobserved characteristics
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correlated with the selection of firms for privatisation are indeed "fixed"
(constant over time3) and are captured during the pre-privatisation pe-
riod by the performance measures that are examined. However, the
authors point out that this method does not take care of all potential
forms of bias, such as would occur, for example, if better firms were to
be selected for privatisation. They try to exclude this possibility directly,
by contrasting the pre-privatisation performance of "managerially-
controlled firms" with that of firms controlled by other types of owner.4
In our opinion, it is not the answer to the problem. Firstly, man-
agers in Russia, for example, often control their firms indirectly,
through dummy firms, and "officially" managerially-owned firms are
only a part of the whole picture. Secondly, the managers' decision to
privatise their enterprise does not mean that they will be able to be-
come its largest shareholders.
Finally, according to the agency theory and the problem of moral
hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the manager benefits from per-
quisites. The owner-manager will consume perquisites up to the point
where the marginal utility from perquisite consumption no longer off-
sets the disutility from the decrease in the market value of the firm.
The smaller the share of the equity owned, the smaller are the frac-
tions of the costs from the decreased market value which must be
borne, while the owner-manager is still able to take the full benefit
from perquisite consumption. On the other hand, the smaller the share
of equity owned, the greater is the threat of being fired. Therefore, the
compulsion is to behave optimally, while the optimal share of equity
can be less than what is needed to be the largest shareholder but suf-
ficient not to be fired. When ownership of capital is dispersed between
small shareholders, it is not necessary to own shares in the firm in or-
der to concentrate the control of it. That is why the manager can be
interested in the privatisation of the enterprise in order to exit from the
control of the state, but not interested enough to become the largest
shareholder.
                                               
3 This supposition seems to us rather unrealistic.
4 It should be noticed that Frydman et al (1998) classify a firm as "managerially
controlled" when it is managerially-owned, i.e. managers are its largest share-
holders. However, since the work by Bearle and Means (1932), a firm is con-
sidered manager-controlled when it has no major shareholder. We shall use the
term "manager-controlled firm" in the generally-accepted meaning.
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Therefore, the lack of studies on the impact of privatisation on
enterprise performance in Russia, and the incompleteness of the
methods for an evaluation of this impact, makes the work in this direc-
tion actual, pressing and promising.
3. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY, THE BASIC HYPOTHESES
AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of the study is to provide empirical evidence on the im-
pact of privatisation on the performance of large and medium-sized
industrial enterprises in Russia. We will check empirically the general
hypothesis that privatisation has promoted performance improvements,
even though these improvements have been attenuated by the nega-
tive influence of the transition processes.
The more detailed hypotheses to be checked are as follows.
1. Privatisation has a positive impact on a firm's ability to gener-
ate revenue growth. Studies by Megginson et al (1994), La Porta and
Lopez-de-Silanes (1997), Grosfeld and Nivet (1997), and Frydman et al
(1997, 1998) support this hypothesis. Commander et al (1996) do not
find a strong relationship between ownership changes and output and
capacity utilisation in Russia.
2. Privatisation leads to an increase in profitability. Megginson et
al (1994) and La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) support the hy-
pothesis with their empirical results. Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) do
not find much evidence that privatisation itself increases a firm's profit-
ability. They show that net income-based profitability measures im-
prove after privatisation, but EBIT-based profitability measures do not.
Frydman et al (1997) consider profits to be extremely volatile and sub-
ject to a number of accounting decisions in the short-term, especially
with respect to costs, that bear little relation to long-term performance.
Earle and Estrin (1997) also argue that profitability and efficiency may
be poor measures of behavioural change in the short-run, because
many types of restructuring may impose higher short-run costs. We
have a rather long period in our sample in order to assess the long-
term consequences of privatisation. However, to our mind, profit can
hardly be considered to be the basic objective of Russian enterprises.
The Russian tax system enforces enterprises to hide profit in order to
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minimise taxes. Employees and managers are large shareholders and
they are not interested in profit maximising because they have other
channels of welfare improvement.
3. Privatisation results in improvements in operating efficiency.
Megginson et al (1994), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997), Ander-
son et al (1997), Frydman et al (1997), Dewenter and Malatesta (1998)
empirically document the hypothesis. Earle and Estrin (1997) find a
generally positive impact of shareholding on the labour productivity of
Russian firms.
4. Privatisation does not lead to reductions in employment. The
hypothesis is empirically supported by Megginson et al (1994) and
Frydman et al (1997), and rejected by La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1997). Commander et al (1996) show that the impact of privatisation
on firms' employment behaviour in Russia is apparently weak. Earle
and Estrin (1997) also find that the impact of shareholding on layoffs in
Russian firms is very weak.
5. Privatisation has a positive influence upon the level of workers'
wages. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) support the hypothesis
in their study of privatisation in Mexico. A study by Commander et al
(1996) shows that the influence of ownership upon changes in the
wage rate is generally insignificant for Russian firms.
3.1. Performance evaluation
The performance of enterprises in Russia is subject to the proc-
esses of transition (price liberalisation, lowering of foreign trade
barriers, liquidation of the state system of planning and control,
disorganisation of production links, commercialisation of the bank-
ing system, etc.) that have taken place since 1992. Change of
ownership is only one of these processes. Along with Frydman et al
(1997), we shall try to separate the effects of transition and privati-
sation, but in another way5.
We intend to use a set of panel data from industrial enterprises in
the Sverdlovsk Oblast (Region) of Russia. The analysis of panel data is
subject to one of the most active and innovative bodies of literature in
                                               
5 Frydman et al (1998) use an approach similar to ours in their latest work pub-
lished in 1998.
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econometrics. As Greene (1995) remarks, time-series cross-sectional
data can be used to examine issues that could not be studied in either
cross-sectional or time-series settings alone. With panel data, one can
model the heterogeneity across groups or units which is typical in mi-
croeconomic data. We shall use data on enterprise performance be-
fore and after privatisation in order to catch the effect of ownership
changes. The panel structure of the sample gives the opportunity to
control for individual (firm-specific) effects.
In the models for panel data, time effects are often viewed as
"transitions" or discrete changes of state (Greene, 1995). It permits
the division of the privatisation effect, specific to the change of owner-
ship, and the transition effect, reflecting the significant downward
pressure that transition processes in the Russian economy have put on
enterprises.
Using fixed and random effects models (Johnston and DiNardo,
1997; Greene, 1995) will deliver the estimation for the equations.
The general form of the regression equations for the fixed effects
model will be as follows:
yit = ai + Xitb + eit, (1)
where y is the value of the dependent variable for the cross-sectional
unit (the firm) i at time t; X is the matrix of the values of the explanatory
variables for unit i at time t; a is considered to be constant over time
and specific to the ith firm
If the random effects model is used, it has the following structure:
yit = ai + Xitb + ui + eit, (2)
where u is a random disturbance constant over time and specific to
the ith firm.
However, as Greene (1995) remarks, the relevant distinction
between the two models is not whether the effect is fixed or not.
The distinction is whether the effect is correlated with the explana-
tory variables. In order to choose the right model, the Hausman
specification test should be performed.
If our random effects model is correctly specified and u is un-
correlated with X, the subset of the coefficients that are estimated
by the fixed-effects estimator and the same coefficients that are
estimated by the random-effects estimator should not statistically
differ.
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3.2. Selection bias
The assumption of the exogeneity of privatisation can bring into ques-
tion the results in that privatisation might not affect the performance of
enterprises but, vice versa, performance could determine privatisation.
This is a well-known selection bias problem. The most likely form of
selection bias is that privatised firms perform better than state ones
because they were simply better firms and were privatised for this rea-
son. To evaluate the presence of selection bias of that kind, we will
test for the effect of the performance of enterprises scheduled to be
privatised on the likelihood of privatisation. We shall use conditional
(fixed-effects) logistical analysis because our data are grouped and the
likelihood can be calculated relative to each group. The fixed-effects
logit model can be written as follows:
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where PRIV equals 0 if enterprise i is a state-owned one in year t, and
1 if it is a privatised one, k i1  is the observed number of ones for the
dependent variable in the ith group, T is the number of observations,
and F()×  is a cumulative logistic distribution function.
3.3. Performance measures
The performance measures we are interested in are presented in Ta-
ble 1.
As Frydman et al (1997) remark, revenues can be considered the
best measure of the advantages of private ownership. Revenues seem
not only to be less subject to manipulation and more transparent to an
outside observer, but also more future-oriented and unpredictable on
the basis of past history. Revenues are matters of entrepreneurial, risk-
taking activity, even in mature economies. We intend to use the annual
rate of the growth of real sales (revenue) of products, excluding in-
come from any sales of assets. In calculating real sales, we deflate the
revenue data using a regional producer price index.
As measures of profitability, two indicators are used, profit margin
(profit/sales) and costs per unit (costs/sales). We use total profit, i.e.
operating profit (profit resulting from the predominant activity of the
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Table 1. The hypotheses to be tested; the studies where they have
been tested already; and the indicators to be used in our study
Hypotheses
to be tested
The studies where
the hypotheses have been
tested already
Indicators to be
used
1. Privatisation has
a positive impact
on a firm's ability
to generate revenue
growth
Megginson et al (1994),
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1997), Grosfeld and Nivet
(1997), Frydman et al (1997),
Commander et al (1996)
Real sales
2. Privatisation
leads to increases
in profitability
Megginson et al (1994), La
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1997), Frydman et al (1997),
Earle and Estrin (1997),
Dewenter and Malatesta
(1998)
Profit margin
(return on sales)
and costs
per unit
3. Privatisation
results in improve-
ments in operating
efficiency
Megginson et al (1994), La
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1997), Anderson et al (1997),
Frydman et al (1997), Earle
and Estrin (1997), Dewenter
and Malatesta (1998)
Sales
per employee
4. Privatisation does
not lead to
employment
reduction
Megginson et al (1994),
Frydman et al (1997), La Porta
and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997),
Commander et al (1996), Earle
and Estrin (1997)
Number
of employees
5. Privatisation has
a positive influence
upon the level of
workers' wages
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1997), Commander et al
(1996)
Unit labour
costs
firm) plus other revenue matched against other expenses of the
firm, after depreciation but before taxes and interest. In our opin-
ion, net income after taxes, as used by Megginson et al (1994) and
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997), is not suitable to the condi-
tions of the Russian transition economy where taxes are changed
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every year. Therefore in Russia, net income after tax is greatly in-
fluenced by government decisions and could not characterise how
successfully a firm has operated. It seems more preferable to use
net operating income, or earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT),
because interest costs can introduce unwanted effects of the
capital structure on the profit measure. However, firstly, in the
conditions of falling demand, total profit seems to us more prefer-
able than operating income, because it is a better characteristic of
the entrepreneurial, risk-taking activity of managers. Secondly, in
contradistinction with profits before tax, which are destined for
those who are outside a firm, the structure of costs is used inter-
nally by managers. It is closed information unobtainable for re-
search purposes. However, in order to clarify the effect of privati-
sation on the profit margin under the impact of the capital struc-
ture, we intend to control for debt scaled by revenues.
Costs per unit show the cost side of the operation. We use the
cost of goods sold (including manufacturing costs) and operating ex-
penses; therefore costs per unit provides information on the operating
profit margin of a firm (operating profit margin = 1 – costs per unit).
However, these costs also contain interest, and we use debt scaled by
revenues as the control variable in order to exclude the effect of capi-
tal structure from the effect of privatisation.
Comparison of the two specifications helps to reveal the impact of
privatisation upon other elements than operating profit.
Our primary measure of operating performance is sales per em-
ployee. Sales (deflated by the regional producer price index) per em-
ployee provide an estimate of labour productivity. This indicator is es-
pecially important. As Nickell (1996) reminds us, productivity growth is
the cause of the "wealth of nations".
Number of employees (the growth rate of employment) can be
used to analyse employment strategy under privatisation and to esti-
mate if SOEs are indeed over-staffed.
Unit labour costs are a measure of operating performance (we
use all kinds of payments to employees). At the same time, they
permit the checking of the hypothesis that employees of SOEs are
over-paid.
These indicators are those most commonly used as a firm's
performance measures, and the majority of them were used in the
studies mentioned above. The hypotheses to be tested; the studies
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where they have been tested already; and the indicators to be used
in our study are presented in Table 1.
We assume that the performance results of a firm are subject
to the change of ownership on the one side, and the transition
processes on the other. The conditions of economic crisis, huge
inflation, a slump in demand, inability to pay, the tax burden, lack
of working capital, etc. put significant downward pressure on per-
formance results. We assume that privatisation changes the dynam-
ics of the transition processes, and the change is the privatisation
effect, which reflects the success or failure of the privatised en-
terprise in moderating the transition effect.
In order to capture the privatisation effect, we relate a firm's
performance results to its ownership type. There is, however, a
problem of timing: when can an enterprise be considered a priva-
tised one? Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) define the privatisation
date as the month when a firm's shares begin trading on a public
stock exchange. This approach is not appropriate to Russia be-
cause the majority of the shares of a privatised enterprise in Russia
can be sold to employees before they are traded on a public stock
exchange. We use the date of approval of a firm's privatisation plan
by the regional Committee for State Equity Management. The idea
behind this is that, after approval, the enterprise officially exits from
management by the state.
However, the date of approval of a privatisation plan can be
considered a rather formal mark. The majority of researchers as-
sociate the moment of privatisation with the diminution of the
state's shareholding past a certain minimal boundary. For example,
Earle and Estrin (1997) define an enterprise as "state-owned" if the
state holds at least 50% of its shares. Anderson et al (1997) con-
sider a firm to be privatised when more than one-third of its shares
have been transferred to private investors (thus, 66% of shares re-
main in state ownership). Frydman et al (1998) mean by a priva-
tised firm one which is (partially or totally) privatised through the
privatisation of a predecessor state-owned company in which the
combined holdings of private parties gives them a blocking power.
Private parties have a blocking power if they control a percentage
of votes which is formally sufficient to block major decisions at the
general shareholders meeting. (For Russian joint-stock companies,
a blocking share is 25% plus one. Thus, even if the state holds up
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to 75% minus one of the shares, an enterprise should be defined
as "privately-owned".) La Porta et al (1998) say that a corporation
has a controlling shareholder (ultimate owner) if this shareholder's
direct and indirect voting rights in the firm exceed 20%, because
this is usually enough to have effective control of a firm. They pre-
sent evidence that, in the majority of cases, such ultimate owners
are also part of the management of the firm. Mikkelson et al (1997)
define a blockholder as the owner of 5% or more of outstanding
ordinary stock.
The arbitrary nature of the definition of a dominant share stake
brought us to a decision not to determine this dominant stake
a priori but to analyse what influences a state stake has upon the
performance of an enterprise. We separate state shareholding into
several groups: 100% (enterprise is formally privatised, but the
state has not yet begun to sell its shares); from 100% to 75%
(absolute control); from less than 75% to 51% (majority control);
from less than 51% to 25% (blocking control); from less than 25%
to 5% (a blockholding permitting control in coalition with other
shareholders); from less than 5% to 1% (merely a presence), and,
finally, less than 1%.
We also disaggregate the average effect of privatisation into
separate effects caused by the different privatisation methods
(options of facilities for employees) which can be applied. It is a
widespread belief that, in the environment of the post-communist
transition, the fact of privatisation, with its concomitant de-
politicisation and greater efficiency, is more important than the way
in which firms are privatised (Anderson et al, 1997). Anderson et al
find no significant differences in the effectiveness of privatisation
methods in seven countries of central and eastern Europe. In Rus-
sia, however, methods of privatisation influence the initial structure
of ownership and control in privatised enterprises (see, for exam-
ple, Earle and Estrin, 1997).
There are three options of facilities for employees6. Option 1
provides employees with 25% of non-voting shares free of charge,
up to 10% of voting shares by sale, and 10% of voting shares
through an employee share fund; top managers can buy up to 5%
                                               
6 There are some specialities in the privatisation of some food industry enter-
prises, for example, but they are not so great as to distort the whole picture.
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of the voting shares. In choosing option 2, employees can buy 51%
of the voting shares and an additional 10% of the shares through
the employee share fund. In the case of option 3, a group of em-
ployees (as a rule, top managers) can buy 20% of the voting
shares and other employees (including the aforementioned group)
a further 20%. They can also later buy 10% of the voting shares
through the employee share fund.
We distinguish also the buy-out of leased assets because in
this case employees received 100% of shares. Many enterprises
were initially privatised by a lease of assets without buy-out rights.
After the beginning of mass privatisation, they were transformed
into joint-stock companies and their employees were able to
choose the option of the facilities for the privatisation of the resid-
ual state equity. That is why we consider also an option 1a, where a
leased enterprise later chooses option 1, and option 2a, when op-
tion 2 was chosen later.
Of course, it is only the initial distribution of shares which
could be changed significantly in subsequent years. Nevertheless,
this initial distribution determines control in privatised firms and
could influence the performance of privatised enterprises during
the first years after privatisation.
In order to capture the dynamics of the effect of privatisation,
we also use two other specifications. Firstly, we replace the privati-
sation dummy variable with one representing the length of the
post-privatisation period of a firm. However, it helps us to catch
only the linear annual effect of privatisation. That is why in the sec-
ond specification we introduce four years after privatisation as in-
dependent dummy variables. They permit us to mark out annual
positive or negative shifts in post-privatisation performance results.
The performance results may vary systematically for a variety
of reasons. We control for firm size, industry affiliation, level of
competition in the industry, and some others.
It is well known that the size of enterprises in eastern Europe
was often not dictated by economic considerations, and, on aver-
age, they tend to be larger than those in developed countries
(Kornai, 1992). Nevertheless, as it was shown by Frydman et al
(1997), larger firms suffer more severely from the transition. The
larger the firm, the more political support it used to have, and the
less business justification was needed for its operation. Usually,
3. The Objective, the Basic Hypotheses and the Methodology 27
these firms were in a quasi-monopolistic position, and were less
likely to be able to respond to a fast-changing environment. Many
of them produced goods for export to the COMECON countries and
lost their markets when the socialist system was crushed. Russian
enterprises lost also their markets in the former republics of the
Soviet Union. Large enterprises in Russia are over-burdened by
out-of-date capital assets, while their overheads, in excess of those
carried by other enterprises, make it difficult for them to compete
against other firms in their own country, never mind those in the
wider economic community.
There are different definitions of size categories in different
countries. For example, Eurostat (The European Observatory for
SMEs, 1993) distinguishes the following broad classes in the Euro-
pean Community: micro-enterprises (0–9 employees), small en-
terprises (10–99 employees), medium enterprises (100–499 em-
ployees), and large-sized enterprises (500 or more employees). We
base our size categories on the current Russian definitions: small
enterprises (up to 199 employees), medium enterprises (200–999
employees), large-sized enterprises (1,000–9,999 employees), and
extra-large ones (10,000 or more employees).
Employment is an endogenous variable and is influenced by
the performance results of the enterprise. However, we are not
going to control for changes in enterprise size during the transition.
We are interested only in the impact of the initial size of the en-
terprise, at the beginning of the period, upon its performance dur-
ing the period. Therefore we divide enterprises into size groups
according to their employment in 1992 and treat the corresponding
dummy variables as exogenous.
We intend to control for industry (sector) affiliation. The prob-
lem of a role for the sectoral dimension in firms' adjustment to the
transition is not yet clear. For example, Pinto et al (1993) and
Estrin et al (1993) conclude that variations in firms' adjustment
were not correlated with industrial sector. Grosfeld and Nivet
(1997) find that there are firm-specific rather than sector-specific
regularities in firms' reaction. However, Barbone et al (1996) find
significant differences in the intensity of the adjustments across
sectors. In the industry of the Sverdlovsk Region (as in Russian in-
dustry as a whole), serious structural changes have taken place
since the transition. The share of the fuel and power industries,
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monopoly industries, in total industrial output has increased signifi-
cantly, as has that of export-oriented industries, ferrous and non-
ferrous metallurgy. At the same time, mostly because of foreign
competition, there has been the sharpest decline in production in
machine-building (caused also by the reduction in the state's de-
fence expenditure), as well as in consumer goods and in the food
industries. Therefore, industry (sector) affiliation seems to be im-
portant in enterprise adjustment to the transitional processes in
Russia. We treat industrial sector affiliation as exogenous because
none of the examined enterprises has changed its sector affiliation
during the period under consideration.
As we have mentioned earlier, competition is considered one of
the most important factors influencing firm performance. We control
for the number of enterprises in the industry sector as a proxy for the
level of competition. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) consider
industry to be competitive if it has at least 10 firms in it, and non-
competitive otherwise. At the same time, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)
find that an increase in the number of firms operating in a market up to
around five has significant effects in reducing market power. Nickell
(1996) uses six: a company and five competitors in the market. We can
use any one of the above-mentioned criteria without changing the re-
sults because the power industry and the fuel industry each have only
four enterprises in the region, while the others have more than 10 en-
terprises. Of course, it provides a very rough estimation of the level of
competition. Firstly, we use the number of enterprises in the industry in
the region, thus neglecting competitors from other regions and
abroad. Secondly, an industry with two firms can be very competitive if
entry barriers are low and incentives to enter the product market are
high, while a large number of firms in an industry can be consistent
with very weak competition. Analysing the Soviet economy, Brown et al
(1993) found that barriers to competition in Russia arose as the result
of product markets that were highly segmented. However, in our study,
the industries classified as non-competitive under the criterion of the
number of firms, the power industry and the fuel industry, are indeed
non-competitive ones because their enterprises are monopolistic in the
regional market, and their entry barriers are very high.
There is also another problem. The number of enterprises in
industry is endogenous and depends on the level of sunk costs and
the degree of price competition. Moreover, in transition economies
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it is likely that the number of rival firms will change in response to
the transition shock (Konings, 1997). If the performance of firms in
the industrial sector affects the number of firms in it, then the re-
gressing of performance results against the number of firms is
problematic. However, even though the number of enterprises in
industrial sectors has indeed changed during the transition in our
sample, none of the sectors has changed its competition group.
In order to control for the processes of transition, we intro-
duce time dummies. They help to isolate the improvements in per-
formance caused by privatisation from those that are the results of
general changes in the economic environment (there were no such
variables in the previous version of our study (Ïåðåâàëîâ et al,
1999), which caused an overestimation of the effects of privatisa-
tion).
In our specifications for profit margin and costs per unit, we
control also for the inflation rate. (We use a regional producer
price index as the rate of inflation.) It is a well-known phenomenon
that costs are underestimated and profits are overestimated when
historical costs are used and the inflation rate is high. Of course,
inflation is subject to the behaviour of enterprises. However, no
one enterprise (except for monopolistic ones, although their prices
are regulated) can determine inflation. We control for non-
competitive industries, and this permits a consideration of the infla-
tion rate as an exogenous factor.
We will estimate the following basic equations (model 1):
PERFijt = a + b1PRIVit + b2OTRj + b3SIZEi + b4Tt + b5COMPj + ni + xit, (4)
where PERF is the analysed performance indicator; PRIV is a dummy
variable representing the type of ownership (PRIV=1 if the firm was
privatised in year t and 0 otherwise); OTR is a dummy variable repre-
senting the industry sector (OTR=1 if the firm belongs to the jth indus-
try sector and 0 otherwise); SIZE are dummy variables representing the
size of the firm; T are time dummies; and COMP is a dummy variable
representing the degree of market power in the industry (COMP=1 if
the industry has at least 5 firms in it and 0 otherwise).
To examine the trend of the increase in the performance level follow-
ing privatisation, we use a specification (model 1b) with a variable repre-
senting the length (in years) of a post-privatisation period of a firm (DP):
PERFijt = a + b1DPit + b2OTRj + b3SIZEi + b4Tt + b5COMPj + ni + xit. (5)
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Another specification is used for estimating the non-linear effects
of privatisation (model 1a):
PERFijt = a + b1PRIVit + b2OTRj + b3SIZEi + b4Tt + b5COMPj +
+ bk itk
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PrS + ni + xit.    (6)
where PrS are dummy variables representing the number of years
since privatisation and are equal to 1 in year t if it is the kth year (k = 1,
2, 3, 4) since the enterprise was privatised.
Thus, we can divide the privatisation effect into time-invariant (variable
PRIV) and time-variant (variables PrS) models of behaviour.
We also use some other models. In model 2, the variable PRIV (4)
was replaced by independent variables VAR1; VAR2; VAR1a; VAR2a;
VAR3; and LEAS, reflecting the options of privatisation. We also intro-
duce dummy variables PrS to the later model (model 2a). When we
analyse the influence of the state shareholding on enterprise perform-
ance, we add to the variables of model 2 dummy variables represent-
ing the stake of the state in ownership (model 3) or in equity (model
4). To analyse the non-linear effects of privatisation, we add to model
3 and model 4 the dummy variable PrS (model 3a and model 4a re-
spectively). Finally, we modify models 2, 3 and 4 by introducing a vari-
able representing the length of a post-privatisation period of a firm
(models 2b, 3b and 4b respectively).
To evaluate the presence of selection bias, we analyse how the
performance of enterprises which are on the threshold of privatisation
affects the probability of privatisation. We have panel data, as the
groups are formed by enterprises, but we can also calculate the likeli-
hood of privatisation, relative to each enterprise, for state and priva-
tised observations with the help of the fixed-effects logit model:
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where PRIV equals 0 if an enterprise i is state-owned in period t and 1 if
it is privatised, T is the number of observations for the ith enterprise, k is
the observed number of ones for the dependent variable PRIV in the
group i, and F()×  is a cumulative distribution logistic function. Other vari-
ables are described in Appendix A.
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4. THE SAMPLE
The Sverdlovsk Oblast is one of the most industrially developed regions
and provides 5% of the industrial production of Russia. The process of the
privatisation of industrial enterprises, first of the large ones, was more rapid
here than in the majority of other territories in Russia and in the Urals. In
1992–1993, more than 34% of all industrial enterprises privatised in the
Urals were from the Sverdlovsk Oblast. By 1995, only 7.5% of all industrial
enterprises in the Sverdlovsk Oblast were state-owned (and 7.8% in the
Russian Federation), although they were larger than the average enterprise
in Russia: they had 20.1% of all employees in industry (17.8% in Russia)
and produced 12.2% of all industrial production (11.0% in Russia).
We have a panel of 198 randomly selected industrial firms for the
period 1992–1996. 8 of them were excluded from the list since they
lacked complete information for the whole period and 1 more because
it was broken up in the process of privatisation. The data has been
obtained from the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of State Statistics.
The sample includes only enterprises that existed in 1991 and were
state-owned (Table 2). 8 of the enterprises were not privatised during the
period. Their performance results are used for comparison with those of
privatised enterprises, alongside a consideration of the performance re-
sults of the state-owned enterprises before their privatisation.
The sample covers all the industrial sectors of the Sverdlovsk
Oblast: the power industry; the fuel industry; ferrous metallurgy; non-
ferrous metallurgy; the chemical and petrol-chemical industries; ma-
chine-building; the forestry industry; construction materials; consumer
goods; the food industry; and others. For every enterprise, the data
includes sales, the number of employees, total operating expenses,
pre-tax profit, remuneration of labour, and some other indicators. All
money measures are expressed in thousands of rubles in 1996, using
the producer (industrial sector) price indices as deflators.7
                                               
7 Usually, the consumer price index is used as the deflator. For example, Meggin-
son et al (1994) use the consumer price index because it shows higher inflation
than does the producer price index and, therefore, imparts a conservative bias.
However, in Russia the producer price index shows higher inflation. We use the
sectoral producer price indices instead of the industry-wide one in order to cap-
ture the changes in the physical amounts of production in each industry.
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Table 2. Dynamics of privatisation in the sample
Type of enterprises
Number of enterprises
in the sample
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
State enterprises 146 28 14 10 8
Privatised enterprises, total 43 161 175 179 181
privatised by option 1 7 25 30 31 31
privatised by option 1a 2 3 3 3 3
privatised by option 2 19 92 98 98 100
privatised by option 2a 1 10 11 12 12
privatised by option 3 0 2 3 3 3
privatised by lease/buy-out 14 29 30 32 32
Total 189 189 189 189 189
The sample includes 28.8% of all the enterprises privatised in the in-
dustry of the Sverdlovsk Oblast during 1992–1996 (Appendix B, Table B.1).
The share differs from 8.8% for other industries where 113 different enter-
prises were privatised, to 100% for sectors with only the one privatised en-
terprise (the power and fuel industries). The structure of the sample by sec-
tor and method of privatisation (option of facilities for employees) is pre-
sented in Table B.2 (Appendix B).
The majority (55.2%) of enterprises were privatised by option 2.8
Lease/buy-out is in second place (17.7%) and option 1 in third (17.1%).
6.6% of enterprises were privatised by option 2a. Options 1a and 3 were
used by 1.7% of enterprises in the sample. However, there are some differ-
ences between the sectors. In the power and fuel industries, all enterprises
were privatised by option 1, while in the food and consumer goods industries,
this method was not used at all. Almost half of enterprises in machine-
building, and more than half in the chemical and petrol-chemical industries,
were privatised by option 2. Option 3 was used only in the consumer goods
sector. Lease/buy-out is most often used in ferrous metallurgy (31.8%), the
food industry (31.6%), and the chemical and petrol-chemical industries
(27.3%).
                                               
8 John S. Earle and Saul Estrin (Earle and Estrin, 1997) have just the same
share in their sample — about 60 per cent.
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These differences can be clearly explained by the size of enterprises. As
can be seen from Table 3, option 1 was used in the privatisation of the big-
gest enterprises: their sales, employment, and profits are 1.3-1.9 times
above average. Enterprises privatised by option 1a were also the largest in
terms of employment, but not in the other indicators. The bigger the enter-
prise, the more money employees need for privatisation. But option 1 pro-
vides employees with 25% of non-voting shares free of charge; they can also
buy 10% of the ordinary shares at a price 30% below par value, and man-
agers can buy voting shares at the price equal to the par value.
Table 3. Structure of the sample by method of privatisation (1996), %
Option Lease/
1 1à 2 2à 3
buy-
out
Total
Number of enterprises 17.13 1.66 55.25 6.63 1.66 17.68 100.0
Sales 26.07 0.82 60.17 5.94 0.06 6.94 100.0
Profit 38.37 –1.88 38.77 13.55 0.10 11.09 100.0
Costs 25.26 0.91 61.64 5.54 0.06 6.59 100.0
Employment 26.06 2.16 56.77 6.62 0.15 8.23 100.0
Wages 20.96 1.27 62.17 6.81 0.10 8.70 100.0
Average-size enterprises are privatised by options 2 and 2a. In
this case, 51% of ordinary shares can be sold to employees at a price
that exceeds the par value by 1.7 times.
The smallest enterprises are privatised by option 3. It was deter-
mined by the State Programme of Privatisation of State and Municipal
Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992 that option 3 could be
used only for enterprises with up to 200 employees and 50 million rubles
in fixed assets. In our sample, these enterprises are 20 times below av-
erage. It should be mentioned that option 3 is used rather rarely. This
option requires that a group of managers should take responsibility and-
not admit the bankruptcy of the enterprise. The group of managers
should be very confident of the future of the enterprise and respected by
employees, because employees choose the option. Probably, this is the
reason why option 3 was used in our sample only by 3 enterprises, all in
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Table 4. Dynamics of the basic indicators of the sample
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Sales
Mean, billion rubles 364.5 220.7 237.7 236.0 251.1
Dynamics of mean, % 100.0 60.6 65.2 64.8 68.9
Median, billion rubles 108.1 64.5 61.5 55.3 61.2
Dynamics of median, % 100.0 59.7 56.9 51.2 56.6
Share in industry revenues
Mean, % 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.8
Dynamics of mean, % 100.0 105.3 100.3 109.6 123.2
Median, % 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
Dynamics of median, % 100.0 100.0 100.0 109.1 109.1
Profit margin
Mean, % 38.8 36.3 19.7 23.4 –14.1
Dynamics of mean, % 100.0 93.6 50.6 60.1 –36.4
Median, % 24.9 31.1 18.1 19.6 7.7
Dynamics of median, % 100.0 124.8 72.8 78.4 30.9
Employment
Mean, persons 3047 2888 2652 2445 2282
Dynamics of mean, % 100.0 94.8 87.0 80.2 74.9
Median, persons 1267 1206 1038 918 859
Dynamics of median, % 100.0 95.2 81.9 72.5 67.8
Sales per employee
Mean, million rubles
per employee
116.8 71.2 74.9 74.3 83.6
Dynamics of mean, % 100.0 60.9 64.1 63.6 71.6
Median, million rubles
per employee
81.8 45.6 54.4 54.8 60.6
Dynamics of median, % 100.0 55.6 66.5 67.0 74.0
Unit labour costs
Mean, % 13.6 17.6 15.1 16.4 25.6
Dynamics of mean, % 100.0 128.9 111.0 119.9 187.7
Median, % 9.3 13.2 13.7 13.1 14.1
Dynamics of median, % 100.0 142.1 148.3 141.8 151.8
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the consumer goods industry, in which there was active demand for
the products and for which there seemed to be continuous demand
in the future. They were a fur company, a carpet firm and a sports-
wear firm.
Privatisation by lease/buy-out began in 1990, and employees
were obliged to acquire all the assets they leased at the end of the
lease period. It was rather difficult, and lease/buy-out was not used for
large enterprises. In our sample, such enterprises are 2.5 times below
average.
For example, in 1996, 3,470 employees worked in an average
enterprise from the sample privatised by option 1; 2,367 by option 2;
214 by option 3; and 1,076 by lease/buy-out.
The sample of enterprises makes a satisfactory coverage of the
regional industry: it provides 49.1% of total sales in the industry in
1992 and 75.7% in 1996 (Table B.3, Appendix B). The share changes
from 36.4% in the consumer goods industry to 99.8% in the fuel in-
dustry. 62.8% of all industrial employees worked in the enterprises in
our sample in 1992 and 60.3% did so in 1996. This allows us to con-
sider the sample as a representative one. The dynamics of the basic
indicators of the sample is presented in Table 4.
The analysis was carried out with the help of STATA. The checklist
of the variables used is presented in Appendix A.
5. RESULTS OF THE STUDY
5.1. Average effects of privatisation
The average effects of privatisation are estimated in models 1, 1a, and
1b (Tables C.1–C.5).
Revenue growth. Privatisation has a statistically insignificant time-
invariant influence upon revenue growth (Table C.1). We failed also to
find any linear trend increase (decrease) or non-linear post-privatisation
effects in sales. At the same time, there was a considerable negative
transition effect: a decrease in revenue by 43.8–46.3% in 1993, by 45.6–
51.5% in 1994, by 62.2–68.0% in 1995, and by 59.9–66.2% in 1996.
Enterprises in the machine-building and consumer goods industries ex-
perienced a significant diminution in their real sales, as opposed to en-
terprises in the chemical and petrol-chemical industries and in the
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construction materials industry, which showed a growth in revenues (RE
estimators).
Employment. Privatisation does not have a statistically significant
impact upon average employment (Table C.2). Employment is nega-
tively influenced by the transition: a reduction by 14.4–14.7% in
1994, by 22.8–25.0% in 1995 and by 34.3–34.8% in 1996. Enter-
prises in the forestry and consumer goods industries significantly
reduced employment.
Profit margin. The profit effect of privatisation is insignificant (Table
C.3). The transition had a considerable positive effect on profit margin
while the effect of the level of credits per unit of sales was negative.
Costs per unit of sales. As can be seen from Table C.4, privatisation
has a strong one-off impact on the cost side of production, equal to a
0.12–0.15 ruble reduction per ruble of revenue (models 1 and 1a). The
transition resulted in an increase in the indicator for the whole period.
Enterprises in non-ferrous metallurgy, the fuel industry and the con-
sumer goods industry saw increased costs, as opposed to enterprises in
machine-building. Competition also causes an increase in costs. As
could be expected, the level of credits per unit of sales had a positive
influence on the indicator while the rate of inflation saw a vice versa ef-
fect.
Productivity of labour. There is no statistically significant influence of
privatisation upon the productivity of labour (Table C.5). The transition
seems to be the only factor that determines the productivity of labour,
and its influence is negative. The negative shift in the productivity of la-
bour caused by the transition was 43.8–43.9 million rubles (in 1996
prices) per employee in 1993, 39.2–39.6 million in 1994, and 40.0–42.4
million in 1995.
We have tried also to estimate an equation with unit labour costs
as dependent variables, but the tests for models 1, 1a and 1b are not
fulfilled. In Russian firms, wages and other payments to employees are
not the only source of payment for labour, so we also tried another
indicator of performance, a firm's total labour expenditure, including on
indirect ones like expenses for social purposes per unit of revenue
(unit total labour costs). Unfortunately, the results are just the same. It
should be mentioned that estimations for these indicators are invalid
also for all the other models used in our study.
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Thus, models 1, 1a and 1b show that privatisation has an effect
"on average" only on costs per unit of sales. However, the approach
used in our research, as well as in many other studies, is too aggre-
gated. Consequently, we tried to disaggregate the averages and to
examine the effects of privatisation on firms taking different options of
privatisation (models 2, 2a and 2b).
5.2. Effects of different options of privatisation
The results obtained by model 2a are presented in the same Tables C.1–
C.5. As one can see, introducing different options of privatisation
changes the whole picture.
Firstly, we find a statistically significant impact of some options of
privatisation upon such indicators as revenue growth and employment,
indicators that are not influenced by privatisation "on average".
Disaggregation helps also to mark out a positive post-privatisation
trend increase in productivity of labour equalling 10.8 million rubles (in
1996 prices) per employee annually (model 2b). However, when we
used model 2a, we saw only a lagged effect in the 3rd year after priva-
tisation (Table C.5).
Secondly, model 2a (the results from model 2b that are not pre-
sented are very similar) evidences that some options of privatisation
are better (or worse) in a certain sense than others, and the effect is
time-invariant. Option 1 decreases revenue growth by 30.7–33.1% and
employment by 11.0% (Table C.2, RE estimator). Option 2 decreases
costs by 0.11–0.13 rubles per ruble of revenue (Table C.4, RE estima-
tor). Lease/buy-out also reduces costs by 0.11 rubles per ruble of
revenue (Table C.4, model 2, RE estimator). If a firm is privatised by
option 2a, it leads to revenue growth of 26.7–48.8% and a reduction in
costs by 0.18 rubles per ruble of revenue (Table C.4, RE estimator).
The shortcoming of the approach used in models 1 and 2, how-
ever, is the rather formal character of the date of privatisation. As we
mentioned earlier, we use the date of approval of a firm's privatisation
plan by the regional Committee for State Equity Management because,
after the approval, the enterprise officially exits from management by
the state. The majority of researchers, however, consider a state
shareholding to be more relevant. In order to analyse the effects of a
state-held stake in ownership and equity, we used models 3 and 4 and
their modifications.
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5.3. Effects of a state-held stake in ownership and equity
Revenue growth. As in model 2, there is a time-invariant negative
effect of privatisation upon revenue growth for option 1 and a positive
effect for option 2a. Model 3 also shows a statistically significant nega-
tive influence of an ownership stake held by the state, but only in three
cases: when the stake is from 1 to 5% (FE estimator) or from 5 to 25%
(RE estimator), and when it is from 75 to 100% (Table C.6). The effect
is considerable: revenue decreases by 39.7% (the stake is 1–5%) or
by 15.2% (the stake is 5–25%) and by 31.3–34.4%, when the stake is
from 75 to 100%). We found exactly the same effect when we analysed
the role of an equity stake (in ordinary shares) held by the state
(model 4).9
Employment. When an ownership or equity stake held by the state
is from 5 to 25%, it causes a statistically significant reduction in em-
ployment by 8.2–10.0% (Table C.7). Model 4 confirms also that option
1 leads to employment reductions (RE estimator).
Profit margin. As was mentioned above, we failed to find any ef-
fect of privatisation upon profit margin "on average". However, we find
that profit decreases by 0.19–0.22 rubles per ruble of revenue where
there is a state-held stake in ownership (equity) between 5% and 25%,
and by 0.20–0.23 rubles per ruble of revenue if the stake is from 25%
to 51% (Table C.8).
Costs per unit of sales. Models 3 and 4 confirm that options 2, 2a
and lease/buy-outs reduce costs per unit of sales (Table C.9, RE esti-
mator). Model 3 demonstrates also that a state ownership stake de-
creases costs by 0.13 rubles per ruble of revenues when it is from 51
to 75%, but increases costs by 0.10–0.18 rubles per ruble of revenues
when it is from 25 to 51%. When a state equity stake is from 25 to
51%, it increases costs by 0.11 rubles per ruble of revenues. The
transition has a negative impact upon sales per unit during the whole
period.
                                               
9 We have to differ between the share of the state in ordinary shares and in
votes, because when the state has more than 20% in equity, only 20% of
state-owned shares are considered to be voting ones. When we use “a stake
in ordinary shares", we examine the real stake of the state in voting rights be-
cause this determines the control rights that it has.
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Labour productivity. Models 3 and 4 provide no evidence that ei-
ther a state stake or privatisation options affect labour productivity.
However, model 4 confirms a lagged positive effect of privatisation:
labour productivity increases by 32.6 million rubles per employee (in
1996 prices) in the third year after privatisation.
6. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
Thus, our study provides evidence that the privatisation of industrial
enterprises by itself "on average" does not produce performance im-
provements, except in costs per unit of revenue and, to some extent,
in productivity of labour. We failed to find time-invariant effects of pri-
vatisation, a post-privatisation linear trend increase (decrease), or non-
linear (lagged) effects, for all the other performance measures. These
results are in contradistinction with the above-mentioned majority of
the empirical studies of privatisation in different countries where, as a
rule, privatisation has had a statistically significant positive influence on
the performance of firms. However, this means only that privatisation in
Russia, though in any case it is a transfer of property rights from the
state to the private sector, is a heterogeneous process that needs
more detailed analysis.
This idea was supported when we revealed that some of the op-
tions of privatisation do influence the performance of privatised en-
terprises, but the influence is not always positive. It means that some
of the options of privatisation are better (worse) in a certain sense than
others and produce time-invariant effects. For example, option 1 de-
presses revenue growth and reduces employment. Option 2 and
lease/buy-outs reduce costs per unit of revenue. Option 1a shows no
statistically significant effect at all. Option 2a considerably decreases
costs per unit of revenue and is the only one that increases revenue
growth.
It is obvious that this effect is determined not by the options but
by the ownership structure to which the options lead. The effect is
time-invariant; it means that the initial ownership structure is relevant.
Unfortunately, we do not have information on ownership structure. It is
interesting, however, that the options with wider possibilities for man-
agers to obtain control over the enterprise after privatisation demon-
strate a more obvious positive effect. These are: option 2, which
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permits managers to buy a part of 51% of the ordinary shares intended
for employees; lease/buy-outs, where managers can have a large
equity stake; and option 2a, where managers can have a large equity
stake by leasing the enterprise and using all the possibilities mentioned
above after the selection of option 2.10 (In our study, good results are
also shown by option 3, but the small amount of enterprises where the
option was used did not permit us to make any statistically significant
inferences about it.)
Option 1 seems to be the worst. Probably, this fact can be ex-
plained by the considerable dispersion of shares among insiders at
such firms and by the interests of the owner-managers. In order to
concentrate share ownership, the managers could be interested in
stimulating employee-owners to retire and sell their shares.
As one can see, the behaviour of enterprises privatised by option
1 is different from those privatised by option 1a, while those privatised
by option 2 are also different to those privatised by option 2a. It means
that the generally-accepted unification of those enterprises privatised
via options 1 and 1a, and by options 2 and 2a, can seriously distort the
results of the study.
As we have found, an ownership or equity stake held by the state
usually does not play any role. However, if the state has a blockholding
of between 5% and up to 25% of ownership (or equity), it negatively
influences revenue growth, employment and profit margin. When the
state has blocking control (from 25% to less than 51%), it suppresses
profit margin and increases costs per unit of sales. This is a real drop
in performance, and it takes place only for the above-mentioned sizes
of state share. (When the size of the state's stake is from 51 to 75%,
we found a reduction in costs per unit of revenue). In our opinion, this
could be the confirmation of the fact that, when the state retains a
significant share stake but loses majority control and, especially,
blocking control, there are no new shareholders that have a sufficient
blockholding to monitor the managers properly, and the latter can
follow their own objectives at the expense of other shareholders (moral
hazard).
                                               
10 Earle and Estrin (1997) found that, relative to firms following option 2, firms
following option 1 tend to have more concentrated outside ownership and firms
following the lease-buyout method tend to have less. In our opinion, the more
concentrated is the internal ownership, the higher is the managers’ stake.
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All cases of the size of the stake held by the state are compared
to the case when an enterprise is privatised but its shares have not yet
begun to sell. That is why the corporatisation of a state-owned enter-
prise, i.e. its transformation into a joint-stock company without the sale
of shares, is not worse than its privatisation and even better than the
case when the share of the state is retained at 5 to 51%.
It should be noted that these privatisation options turn out to be
statistically significant also in the models where the effect of a state
stake in ownership and equity is analysed. It confirms our conclusion
that the structure of private ownership is important in reality, while the
privatisation options substitute for it in our study.
Our results partly support the conclusions of Frydman et al (1998)
about the passivity of the state as a shareholder. The state as a partial
owner is often considered temporary, passive and prepared to let other
owners take control and, even with respect to enterprises in which the
state is the sole owner, neglect is often the rule. The state as a partial
owner can free-ride on the efforts of other owners, and the firms con-
trolled by the state as the sole owner suffer from the absence of
monitoring. In the absence of monitoring, enterprises are controlled by
insiders but in Russia the situation does not change even when the
state shares have been sold, because Russian privatisation conveys
property rights to enterprise insiders. However, the detected drop in
performance when the state loses the majority and blocking control in
a firm could be considered as the evidence of the disciplined role of
the state's stake, if it is large enough. The state as a controlling share-
holder seems to be more preferable than the absence of any control-
ling shareholder at all.
According to our study, a share of the state in ownership seems
to be as important for enterprise performance as its share in equity (in
ordinary shares). This conclusion is in contradiction with the generally-
accepted view that control rights are relevant. It appears to be caused
by the peculiarities of privatisation in Russia. According to Russian pri-
vatisation laws, if the share of the state in equity is more than 20%,
only 20% of the state-owned shares can be ordinary ones. The resid-
ual state-owned shares are considered to be privileged ones (so-called
"type B" shares), and they are converted into ordinary shares after
sale. Thus, the stake of the state in enterprise control is artificially
limited and subject to sharp changes. For example, if the state owns
90% of the equity, it means that its real stake in terms of voting rights
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is 66%. If only 20% of the shares are sold additionally, the state's vot-
ing stake will be reduced to 33%. It makes control in mixed state-
private enterprises very unstable and sensitive to the sale of small
blocks of shares. From this point of view, a stake in ownership can be
more preferable for private shareholders as it is more unbiased and
stable.
We have found performance improvements caused by privatisa-
tion, but not for all the performance measures analysed.
Many researchers find revenue growth to be the most pro-
nounced result of privatisation. We failed to find a time-invariant, linear
trend or non-linear effect of privatisation "on average" upon revenue
growth. Moreover, disaggregating the effects of privatisation, we found
that only option 2a was positively related to the indicator. At the same
time, option 1 and certain stakes of the state in ownership (equity)
suppressed revenue growth.
Thus, our results do not support the hypothesis that privatisation
has a positive impact on a firm's ability to generate revenue growth.
Commander et al (1996) and Earle and Estrin (1997) show that
the impact of privatisation on firms' employment behaviour in Russia is
apparently weak. Our study also demonstrates that privatisation "on
average" does not have any influence on employment. At the same
time, we found that option 1, as well as a state ownership or equity
stake in the range 5% to 25%, are strongly associated with employ-
ment reductions.
Employment reductions seem to be quite "natural" given the out-
put drop during the transition and the high level of over-employment
under which state-owned enterprises operated before they were priva-
tised. The hidden unemployment in Russian industrial firms, where
employees have reductions in hours worked, involuntary, unpaid leaves
of absence, and comparatively low wages which are paid with many
months delay, forces employees to retire. New employees are not
hired, because they are not necessary under conditions of a drop in
output. However, this is a general tendency. Why is this more typical
for firms privatised by option 1? It seems to support the political view
about the effectiveness of privatisation. Political interference in a state-
owned firm results in excessive employment but, after privatisation,
overemployment is sharply reduced in order to increase efficiency.
This should be true for all privatised firms, but does not always take
place.
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In our opinion, one more explanation is possible. Owner-managers
in the firms privatised by option 1 could be more interested in employ-
ment reductions because this option affords managers fewer oppor-
tunities for obtaining significant stakeholdings in their firms (initially
they can have only 5% and a small part of the 20% of ordinary shares
intended for employees.) When employees retire, they often sell the
shares. As a rule, owner-managers organise dummy firms under their
control to buy the shares. Therefore, employment reductions help
managers increase their shareholding.
Concerning the reduction in employment when the state has an
equity stake of 5% to 25%, we have mentioned already that, when the
state keeps a significant shareholding but loses blocking control, other
shareholders do not have a sufficient stake to monitor the managers
properly, and the latter can follow their own objectives. Reductions in
employment, helping managers to increase their shareholding, seems
to be one of these objectives.
Thus, we only partly support the hypothesis that privatisation
leads to employment reductions.
Analysing the relationship beween privatisation and profitability, we
failed to find any effect of privatisation "on average" on profit margin.
Moreover, we found a negative influence of a state-held stake when it is
from 5% to 51%. At the same time, there is a strong positive (reducing)
effect of privatisation on costs per unit of sales. Taking into account that,
firstly, a reduction of costs per unit of sales is identical to growth in op-
erating profit margin and that, secondly, profit margin can be presented
as the sum of the operating profit margin (operating income/sales) and
the profit margin on the firm's other activities ((other revenue – other ex-
penses of the firm)/sales), we can conclude that privatisation caused a
significant growth in operating profit margin and a decrease in the other
incomes of the firm not related to its predominant activity. This effect is
almost entirely caused by options 2, 2a and lease/buy-outs.
To a certain extent, this fact can be explained by the concealing
of profits to reduce the tax burden, as Russian firms used to do. Man-
agers and other employees are large shareholders, and they are not
interested in profit maximising because they have some other possibili-
ties for welfare improvement. Our results are in line with Pagano et al
(1997), who show that the post-IPO (initial public offering) decline in
profitability is subject to moral hazard when controlling shareholders
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have a greater incentive to extract private benefits at the expense of
minority shareholders.
Thus, the hypothesis that privatisation leads to increases in prof-
itability could not be supported. At the same time, privatisation has a
statistically significant positive impact upon operating profitability.
According to Earle and Estrin (1997), shareholding has a generally
positive impact on the labour productivity of Russian firms. We also find
a positive linear trend increase in the productivity of labour after priva-
tisation, or a lagged effect of privatisation. It means that Russian firms
did begin restructuring, but that they had needed a lot of time (three
years after privatisation) to do so.
Thus, our study supports the hypothesis that privatisation results
in improvements in operating efficiency, although these improvements
are not very significant and have a considerable time lag.
In line with Commander et al (1996), we could not find any influ-
ence of privatisation upon the level of workers' wages, at least, upon
unit labour costs and unit total labour costs. These results are inconsis-
tent with the prediction of the social view that the burden of restructur-
ing costs would fall upon employees through wage cuts or reduction of
expenses on social development.
We could also not support the conclusion by Frydman et al (1997)
that larger firms suffer more strongly from the transition. We did not find
any evidence that the size of a firm had any impact on its performance.
Competition does not seem to play an important role in firms'
performance results. However, competition does increase costs per
unit of revenue (Table C.4, models 1 and 1a, RE estimators) and de-
creases labour productivity (Table C.8, model 4a, RE estimator). These
results contradict the findings by Nickell (1996) that competition has a
significant positive effect on productivity growth. La Porta and Lopez-
de-Silanes (1997) showed greater reductions in costs per unit of sales
in the non-competitive sector than in the competitive one in Mexico;
this result is consistent with our findings. At the same time, they failed
to find any influence of competition upon labour productivity. It should
be mentioned that Willig (1987) presents a model in which he dem-
onstrates that increased competition raises managerial effort and
efficiency only if the demand elasticity effect dominates the demand
reduction effect. It could be an explanation why in our study, under
conditions of falling demand, increased competition does not cause
performance improvements.
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In line with Barbone et al (1996), we show also that there are
significant differences of adjustment across industrial sectors. For ex-
ample, enterprises in machine-building reduced revenues, productivity
of labour and costs per unit of sales. If enterprises belong to the
chemical and petrol-chemical industries or to construction materials,
they had revenue growth and a decrease in labour productivity. En-
terprises in the fuel industry increased costs per unit of sales. Enter-
prises of non-ferrous metallurgy increased costs per unit of sales and
decreased labour productivity. Enterprises in the power industry had a
decrease in costs per unit of sales and an increase in labour produc-
tivity. Enterprises in the consumer goods industry decreased sales,
employment, labour productivity and costs per unit of sales. The for-
estry industry decreased employment and labour productivity.
7. SELECTION BIAS
Our study was conducted under an assumption of the exogeneity of pri-
vatisation. However, if enterprises are privatised because they have bet-
ter performance, the results obtained can lead to a misinterpretation of
the relationship between privatisation and performance. The choice of
privatisation option could also be endogenous. Employees and managers
choose from a number of privatisation options and their choice could be
influenced by a number of factors. A reasonable hypothesis would be
that these factors include the past and the expected performance of the
firm.
To evaluate the presence of selection bias, we present a series of
estimates of determinants on the likelihood of privatisation, obtained
with the help of conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression (Table 5).
As independent variables, we use the firm's performance results
studied above. The performance results do influence the probability of
being privatised. An increase of the share in industry revenue plays the
most important role in the probability of privatisation. Firms with de-
creasing employment, profit margin, revenue and productivity of labour
are most likely to be privatised. At the same time, costs per unit of
revenue, unit labour costs, and unit total labour costs do little to influ-
ence the probability of being privatised.
We obtained also some interesting results for various options of pri-
vatisation. The reasons for option selection seem to be quite different.
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As can be seen, the probability of being privatised by option 1 is de-
termined by reductions in employment and profit margin. If a firm has a
diminishing profit margin, employment and labour productivity, but a
growing share in industry revenue, the likelihood of privatisation by
option 2 increases. Enterprises privatised by option 2a, as a rule, have
an increasing share in industry revenue but decreasing labour produc-
tivity before privatisation. (As the choice of privatisation variant seems
to be endogenous, the results from the previous section regarding the
relationship between privatisation variant and performance should be
treated with some caution.)
It is quite opposite to the findings of Anderson et al (1997) that, in
Poland, the firms included in the mass privatisation programme began
to show rapid improvements in profitability two years before they were
formally privatised at the end of 1995. Their explanation for this is that
managers improved performance because they expected to be held
accountable by the future new owners. Dewenter and Malatesta (1998)
also present empirical evidence for 63 firms from different countries
that profitability improves during the three years before privatisation.
They suggest that governments efficiently restructure at least some
firms before selling them.
How can our results be interpreted? Obviously, a firm with an in-
creasing share of the industry looks a more preferable candidate for
privatisation. Nevertheless, why does the worsening of performance
results also play so important a role in the likelihood of privatisation?
To obtain a possible explanation, let us look at some findings concern-
ing the performance results of companies that go public. Such companies
are already private ones before an IPO, but they change concentrated
ownership into a dispersed one.11 This makes the process of the initial
public offering rather similar to privatisation, where over-concentrated state
ownership is changed into dispersed private ownership.
Jain and Kini (1995) show that operating profitability tends to de-
cline after going public and suggest that the decline in performance is
explained at least in part by poorer incentives for managers. Mikkelson
et al (1997) report that operating performance falls significantly in the
first ten years after going public, though it is not related to managers'
incentives. They show that the difference in performance seems
                                               
11 For example, in Italy the average firm has only 3 shareholders (the median)
before an IPO and 3,325 after it (Pagano et al, 1997).
7. Selection Bias 47
Table 5. Determinants of the probability of being privatised
Independent Dependent variables
variables Priv Var1
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z|
marg –3.512*** 0.000 –8.096** 0.024
csales   –.183 0.641   3.984 0.145
sempl   –.000** 0.040
wsales   2.431 0.259
share 13.870*** 0.010   3.303 0.424
eff –1.973 0.255
lntsal –2.262*** 0.000
lntemp –7.208*** 0.000 –26.929*** 0.008
Log Likelihood –104.050 –12.156
chi2(8) = 262.44
Prob >chi2 = 0.0000
chi2(4) = 61.25
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.5994 0.7158
Number of obs 690 120
Independent Dependent variables
variables Var2 Var2a
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z|
marg –3.384*** 0.004 –18.026 0.144
csales –2.091 0.273 –23.511 0.121
sempl   –.000** 0.016    –.000* 0.064
wsales   3.340 0.479   225.697 0.111
share  204.002*** 0.000   523.415* 0.051
eff –2.254 0.583 –78.552 0.132
lntsal –2.234 0.111    7.226 0.248
lntemp  –11.316*** 0.000 –13.348 0.127
Log Likelihood –33.011 –5.974
chi2(8) = 203.02
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
chi2(8) = 26.23
Prob > chi2 = 0.0010
Pseudo R2 0.7546 0.6870
Number of obs 405 55
* — significant at the 10% level, ** — significant at the 5% level,
*** — significant at the 1% level.
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attributable to factors related to the sale of shares by the current
holders, who may attempt to time their equity sales to follow favourable
performance or to precede a decline in performance. Pagano et al
(1997) establish reductions in profitability, investments and financial
leverage, which appear to persist beyond the first three years after the
initial public offering. They show that the post-IPO decline in profitabil-
ity is subject to adverse selection (companies go public when profit-
ability is about to decline permanently) or to moral hazard (controlling
shareholders have a greater incentive to extract private benefits at the
expense of minority shareholders).
These suppositions could be suitable in our case. In Russia, the
state, as a sole owner of industrial enterprises, was eager to sell them
all, except for some which are prohibited from privatisation. Moreover,
the state tried to accelerate the process of privatisation by simplifying
the procedure, providing positive incentives such as considerable
privileges for employees and a clear closing date when voluntary priva-
tisation was over. Nothing was done to restructure enterprises before
privatisation (as it was in the study by Dewenter and Malatesta, 1998).
However, not the owner (the state) but employees (managers, firstly)
were the ones who really came to a decision on privatisation. If they
did not want privatisation, they sought hard to delay it, including enter-
ing their enterprise on a list of enterprises prohibited from being priva-
tised. That is why the decision to be privatised seems to be subject to
adverse selection. However, contrary to the findings of Mikkelson et al
(1997) and Pagano et al (1997), Russian enterprises appeared to be
privatised not when profitability was about to decline but after the de-
cline, and after the decline not only of profitability but also of all the
important indicators of performance.
In contrast to Poland (Anderson et al, 1997), Russian managers
were not afraid of future new owners because the Russian model of
privatisation confers on insiders control over privatised firms. As
Frydman et al (1998) note, it is said to be a common practice in post-
communist countries that those who want to acquire a firm which is to
be privatised attempt, by fair means or foul, to assure that its pre-
privatisation performance is as poor as possible, so that they can buy it
at a lower price. This supposition is not relevant to our study. If it were
so, we would not be able to find any improvements in performance
results after privatisation, because we define the year of privatisation
as the year when a firm's privatisation plan was approved. Usually in
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this year, the shares of the privatised firm were not yet being traded
and, in some cases, it took several years to begin the sale. One of the
more probable explanations could be the desire of managers to force
employees to come to a decision to privatise the enterprise. Employ-
ees seemed to be forced into privatisation by worsening performance
results when exit out of state management seemed to be the
only hope.
However, we do not think this is the case. In Russia, mass privati-
sation began only in 1992 and managers of the enterprises privatised
in 1992–1993 (88.9% of all the privatised enterprises in our sample)
had no time to reduce their performance in the foregoing years. The
worsening results seem to us to be the quite natural consequences of
the disintegration of the planned communist system, the disruption of
previous production links and the transition to a market economy,
when industrial enterprises were thrown into self-determined work.
(Konings and Walsh (1999), for example, show that, for firms which
existed under central planning in Ukraine, disorganisation in production
links constrains employment and productivity growth during the transi-
tion process to a market economy.) These worsening results change
the direction of rent-seeking behaviour by firm managers and stimulate
managers for privatisation. This supposition is supported by the fact
that an increasing share of industry revenue is the most important de-
terminant on the probability of enterprise privatisation (and it shows the
potentialities of the firm), although many other significant indicators
also deteriorated.
Thus, selection bias seems to exist in our sample, but it is nega-
tive selection bias — not the better enterprises are chosen for privati-
sation but those with poorer performance — which obviously handicaps
the impact of privatisation.
8. PRIVATISATION POLICY ADJUSTMENT CONCLUSIONS
There are several privatisation policy adjustment conclusions that could
be made on the basis of the results of the study:
· In spite of all its shortcomings, privatisation has a positive effect
upon the performance of Russian enterprises and should continue as
the preferred course of action.
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· To have improvements in the effectiveness of state-owned en-
terprises, the state could corporatise even some of the enterprises
which are now prohibited from being privatised, i.e. transform them
into joint-stock companies but preserve 100% of the shares in state
ownership, because the mere fact of privatisation is important.
· In order not to aggravate the performance of privatised enter-
prises because of fears of losing control over managers, the state
should keep more than 51% of shares in ownership or should sell suf-
ficient shares to diminish its stake below 5%. The latter should help to
ensure new shareholders having sufficient stakes to monitor managers
properly.
· It seems preferable to reduce the application of option 1, which
produces a negative impact upon firms' performance, and to broaden
the use of options 2, 2a, and lease/buy-out (good results are also
shown in our study by option 3, but the small amount of enterprises
where the option was used did not permit us to make any statistically
significant inferences about it.)
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. List of regression variables
1. Dependent Variables: Performance Measures
All performance money measures are calculated in constant 1996
l prices
lntsal: logarithm of annual rate of revenue growth
lntemp: logarithm of growth rate of employment
marg: ratio of pre-tax profits to sales (profit margin)
csales: ratio of operating expenses to sales (costs per unit of revenues)
sempl: ratio of sales to total number of employees (productivity of la-
bour)
wsales: unit labour costs (ratio of wages to sales)
eff: unit total labour costs (ratio of wages, all other payments to
employees, and expenses for social development to sales)
2. Independent Variables
priv = 1 if enterprise is a privatised one in year t, 0 otherwise
var1_ = 1 if enterprise is a privatised one by option 1 in year t,
0 otherwise
var2_ = 1 if enterprise is a privatised one by option 2 in year t,
0 otherwise
leas = 1 if enterprise is a privatised one by lease/buy-out in year t,
0 otherwise
var1a_ = 1 if enterprise is a privatised one by option 1a in year t,
0 otherwise
var2a_ = 1 if enterprise is a privatised one by option 2a in year t,
0 otherwise
otr1 = 1 if enterprise belongs to ferrous metallurgy, 0 otherwise
otr2 = 1 if enterprise belongs to non-ferrous metallurgy, 0 otherwise
otr3 = 1 if enterprise belongs to power industry, 0 otherwise
otr4 = 1 if enterprise belongs to fuel industry, 0 otherwise
otr5 = 1 if enterprise belongs to machine-building, 0 otherwise
otr6 = 1 if enterprise belongs to chemical and petrol-chemical in-
dustry, 0 otherwise
otr7 = 1 if enterprise belongs to forest industry, 0 otherwise
otr8 = 1 if enterprise belongs to construction materials industry,
0 otherwise
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otr9 = 1 if enterprise belongs to consumer goods industry,
0 otherwise
otr10 = 1 if enterprise belongs to food industry, 0 otherwise
otr11 = 1 if enterprise belongs to other industries
size2 = 1 if it is a medium-size enterprise, from 200 to 999 employees
in 1992, 0 otherwise
size3 = 1 if it is a large enterprise, from 1000 to 9999 employees
in 1992, 0 otherwise
size4 = 1 if it is an extra-large enterprise, more than 10000 employ-
ees in 1992, 0 otherwise
comp = 1 if industry has at least 5 firms in it, 0 otherwise
kred debt-to-sales ratio (credits per unit of sales)
infl annual inflation rate
gol1_ =1 if share of the state in equity is less than 1%, 0 otherwise
gol2_ =1 if share of the state in equity is from 1% to less than 5%,
0 otherwise
gol3_ =1 if share of the state in equity is from 5 %to less than 25%,
0 otherwise
gol4_ =1 if share of the state in equity is from 25% to less than 51%,
0 otherwise
gol5_ =1 if share of the state in equity is from 51% to less than 75%,
0 otherwise
gol6_ =1 if share of the state in equity is from 75% to less than 100%,
0 otherwise
gol7_ =1 if share of the state in equity is 100%, 0 otherwise
ust1_ =1 if share of the state in ownership is less than 1%, 0 other-
wise
ust2_ =1 if share of the state in ownership is from 1% to less than
5%,0 otherwise
ust3_ =1 if share of the state in ownership is from 5% to less than
25%, 0 otherwise
ust4_ =1 if share of the state in ownership is from 25% to less than
51%, 0 otherwise
ust5_ =1 if share of the state in ownership is from 51% to less than
75%, 0 otherwise
ust6_ =1 if share of the state in ownership is from 75% to less than
100%, 0 otherwise
ust7_ =1 if share of the state in ownership is 100%, 0 otherwise
PrS1_ =1 if it is the first year after privatisation, 0 otherwise
PrS2_ =1 if it is the second year after privatisation, 0 otherwise
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PrS3_ =1 if it is the third year after privatisation, 0 otherwise
PrS4_ =1 if it is the fourth year after privatisation, 0 otherwise
T93 =1 if it is 1993, 0 otherwise
T94 =1 if it is 1994, 0 otherwise
T95 =1 if it is 1995, 0 otherwise
T96 =1 if it is 1996, 0 otherwise
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Appendix C
Table C.1. Sales equation
Model 1 (lntsal)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |t|
comp (dropped)   .245 0.484
otr1 (dropped)   .063 0.716
otr2 (dropped)   .065 0.707
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)   .203 0.706
otr5 (dropped) –.506*** 0.001
otr6 (dropped)   .335* 0.087
otr7 (dropped) –.063 0.721
otr8 (dropped)   .331* 0.055
otr9 (dropped) –.514*** 0.007
otr10 (dropped) –.000 0.999
size2 (dropped)   .522 0.248
size3 (dropped)   .425 0.346
size4 (dropped)   .492 0.303
priv –.045 0.650 –.069 0.428
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
t93 –.463*** 0.000 –.448*** 0.000
t94 –.475*** 0.000 –.456*** 0.000
t95 –.642*** 0.000 –.622*** 0.000
t96 –.619*** 0.000 –.599*** 0.000
PrS1
PrS2
PrS3
PrS4
cons   .003 0.937 –.581 0.293
nom (189 categories) F = 3.071 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2107 R – sq overall = 0.2836
Test statistics for the model F(5.751) = 40.11
Prob > F = 0.000
chi2(18) = 298.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 162.30
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Hausman specification test chi2(5) = 0.21
Prob > chi2 = 0.9990
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Table C.1 continued from p. 57
Model 1a (lntsal)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |z| Coef. P > |z|
comp   .246 0.481
otr1   .060 0.732
otr2   .062 0.717
otr3 (dropped)
otr4   .196 0.716
otr5 –.508*** 0.001
otr6   .334* 0.089
otr7 –.064 0.715
otr8   .330* 0.055
otr9 –.517** 0.007
otr10 –.002 0.988
size2   .520 0.248
size3   .422 0.347
size4   .491 0.302
priv –.086 0.432 –.108 0.266
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
t93 –.456*** 0.000 –.438*** 0.000
t94 –.515*** 0.000 –.479*** 0.000
t95 –.680*** 0.000 –.628*** 0.000
t96 –.662*** 0.000 –.597*** 0.000
PrS1   .091 0.281   .075 0.355
PrS2   .076 0.504   .043 0.673
PrS3   .083 0.576   .032 0.796
PrS4   .085 0.674   .041 0.807
cons   .006 0.881 –.574 0.297
nom (189 categories) F = 3.059 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2120 R – sq overall = 0.2841
Test statistics for the model F(9.747) = 22.33
Prob > F = 0.000
chi2(22) = 299.45
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 162.09
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Hausman specification test chi2(9) = 6.51
Prob > chi2 = 0.6877
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Table C.1 continued from pp 57, 58
Model 2a (lntsal)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)   .002 0.996
otr1 (dropped)   .015 0.932
otr2 (dropped)   .027 0.875
otr3 (dropped) –.210 0.696
otr4 (dropped) (dropped)
otr5 (dropped) –.508*** 0.001
otr6 (dropped)   .318 0.106
otr7 (dropped) –.095 0.591
otr8 (dropped)   .229 0.191
otr9 (dropped) –.526** 0.006
otr10 (dropped) –.070 0.680
size2 (dropped)   .490 0.278
size3 (dropped)   .414 0.357
size4 (dropped)   .505 0.291
priv
var1 –.331** 0.020 –.307** 0.008
var2 –.052 0.646 –.128 0.189
leas   .041 0.789 –.013 0.910
var1a –.009 0.984 –.233 0.389
var2a   .488** 0.013   .267* 0.078
t93 –.477*** 0.000 –.432*** 0.000
t94 –.543*** 0.000 –.479*** 0.000
t95 –.716*** 0.000 –.632*** 0.000
t96 –.707*** 0.000 –.607*** 0.000
PrS1   .087 0.296   .082 0.306
PrS2   .081 0.473   .056 0.583
PrS3   .096 0.517   .048 0.700
PrS4   .113 0.575   .064 0.704
cons –.001 0.972 –.289 0.645
nom (189 categories) F = 3.061 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2294 R – sq overall = 0.2965
Test statistics for the model F(13.743) = 17.01
Prob > F = 0.000
chi2(26) = 320.09
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 158.54
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Hausman specification test chi2(13) = 7.93
Prob>chi2 = 0.8479
The number of firms is 189, and the number of observations is 945. *** — significant at the
1% level, ** — significant at the 5% level, * — significant at the 10% level.
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Table C.2. Equation for employment
Model 1 (lntemp)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |t|
comp (dropped) –.167 0.297
otr1 (dropped) –.003 0.966
otr2 (dropped) –.031 0.690
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped) –.168 0.495
otr5 (dropped) –.102 0.141
otr6 (dropped) –.038 0.673
otr7 (dropped) –.198** 0.015
otr8 (dropped) –.042 0.589
otr9 (dropped) –.235*** 0.007
otr10 (dropped)   .021 0.780
size2 (dropped)   .061 0.768
size3 (dropped) –.055 0.788
size4 (dropped) –.028 0.898
priv –.024 0.639 –.022 0.602
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
t93 –.040 0.359 –.041 0.300
t94 –.144*** 0.004 –.146*** 0.001
t95 –.249*** 0.000 –.250*** 0.000
t96 –.347*** 0.000 –.348*** 0.000
PrS1
PrS2
PrS3
PrS4
cons   .002 0.935   .245 0.330
nom (189 categories) F = 2.516 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.240 R – sq overall = 0.228
Test statistics for the model F(5.751) = 47.52
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(18) = 283.55
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 102.68
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Hausman specification test chi2(5) = 0.00
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
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Table C.2 continued from p. 60
Model 1a (lntemp)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)   .003 0.987
otr1 (dropped) –.005 0.946
otr2 (dropped) –.031 0.688
otr3 (dropped)   .168 0.495
otr4 (dropped) (dropped)
otr5 (dropped) –.102 0.142
otr6 (dropped) –.035 0.690
otr7 (dropped) –.196** 0.016
otr8 (dropped) –.041 0.599
otr9 (dropped) –.236*** 0.007
otr10 (dropped)   .021 0.783
size2 (dropped)   .059 0.774
size3 (dropped) –.056 0.783
size4 (dropped) –.027 0.899
priv –.020 0.715 –.018 0.701
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
t93 –.043 0.325 –.044 0.261
t94 –.146** 0.012 –.147** 0.002
t95 –.230*** 0.002 –.228*** 0.000
t96 –.343*** 0.000 –.339*** 0.000
PrS1   .007 0.859   .007 0.856
PrS2 –.025 0.661 –.027 0.588
PrS3 –.029 0.695 –.034 0.578
PrS4   .058 0.569   .050 0.539
cons   .001 0.944   .076 0.790
nom (189 categories) F = 2.514 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.244 R – sq overall = 0.2308
Test statistics for the model F(9.747) = 26.83
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(22) = 287.66
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 103.76
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Hausman specification test chi2(9) = 0.68
Prob > chi2 = 0.999
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Table C.2 continued from pp 60, 61
Model 2a (lntemp)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped) –.173 0.280
otr1 (dropped) –.017 0.828
otr2 (dropped) –.042 0.587
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped) –.164 0.504
otr5 (dropped) –.101 0.148
otr6 (dropped) –.038 0.669
otr7 (dropped) –.204** 0.012
otr8 (dropped) –.074 0.353
otr9 (dropped) –.238*** 0.007
otr10 (dropped)   .000 0.990
size2 (dropped)   .049 0.811
size3 (dropped) –.059 0.770
size4 (dropped) –.023 0.915
priv
var1 –.106 0.140 –.110* 0.051
var2 –.034 0.549 –.049 0.309
leas   .004 0.950 –.018 0.747
var1a –.044 0.856 –.070 0.582
var2a   .159 0.108   .090 0.220
t93 –.037 0.384 –.028 0.456
t94 –.142** 0.013 –.135*** 0.004
t95 –.228*** 0.002 –.218*** 0.000
t96 –.342*** 0.000 –.330*** 0.000
PrS1  .010 0.798   .019 0.625
PrS2 –.019 0.730 –.012 0.801
PrS3 –.022 0.762 –.018 0.762
PrS4   .068 0.505   .069 0.406
cons   .000 0.988   .267 0.287
nom (189 categories) F = 2.484 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.251 R – sq overall = 0.239
Test statistics for the model F(13.743) = 19.20
Prob > F = 0.000
chi2(26) = 298.60
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 100.70
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Hausman specification test chi2(13) = 4.29
Prob > chi2 = 0.987
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Table C.3. Equation for profit margin
Model 1 (marg)
FE regression
Coef. P > |t|
comp (dropped)
otr1 (dropped)
otr2 (dropped)
otr3 (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)
otr5 (dropped)
otr6 (dropped)
otr7 (dropped)
otr8 (dropped)
otr9 (dropped)
otr10 (dropped)
size2 (dropped)
size3 (dropped)
size4 (dropped)
priv –.046 0.685
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
t93   .269*** 0.000
t94   .262*** 0.000
t95   .300*** 0.000
t96 (dropped)
PrS1
PrS2
PrS3
PrS4
infl   .019*** 0.000
kred –.534*** 0.000
cons –.031 0.801
nom (189 categories) F = 1.357*** 0.003
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2720
Test statistics for the model F(6.750)  = 46.71
Prob > F = 0.0000
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Table C.3 continued from p. 63
Model 1a (marg)
FE regression
Coef. P > |t|
comp (dropped)
otr1 (dropped)
otr2 (dropped)
otr3 (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)
otr5 (dropped)
otr6 (dropped)
otr7 (dropped)
otr8 (dropped)
otr9 (dropped)
otr10 (dropped)
size2 (dropped)
size3 (dropped)
size4 (dropped)
priv –.053 0.671
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
t93   .127 0.224
t94   .112 0.348
t95   .219*** 0.010
t96 (dropped)
PrS1 –.100 0.302
PrS2 –.155 0.238
PrS3 –.268 0.117
PrS4 –.374 0.109
infl   .008 0.345
kred –.546*** 0.000
cons   .258 0.241
nom (189 categories) F = 1.366*** 0.003
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2748
Test statistics for the model F(10.746) = 28.27
Prob > F = 0.0000
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Table C.3 continued from pp 63, 64
Model 2a (marg)
FE regression
Coef. P > |t|
comp (dropped)
otr1 (dropped)
otr2 (dropped)
otr3 (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)
otr5 (dropped)
otr6 (dropped)
otr7 (dropped)
otr8 (dropped)
otr9 (dropped)
otr10 (dropped)
size2 (dropped)
size3 (dropped)
size4 (dropped)
priv
var1 –.071 0.664
var2 –.074 0.572
leas   .031 0.862
var1a   .083 0.880
var2a   .107 0.634
t93   .132 0.212
t94   .119 0.320
t95   .221*** 0.010
t96 (dropped)
PrS1 –.103 0.289
PrS2 –.153 0.247
PrS3 –.262 0.127
PrS4 –.365 0.120
infl   .008 0.302
kred –.545*** 0.000
cons   .237 0.270
nom (189 categories) F = 1.351*** 0.003
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2759
Test statistics for the model F(14.742) = 20.19
Prob > F = 0.0000
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Table C.4. Equation for costs per unit
Model 1 (csales)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P >|z|
comp (dropped)   .288* 0.060
otr1 (dropped) –.020 0.794
otr2 (dropped)   .333*** 0.000
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)   .418* 0.075
otr5 (dropped) –.181*** 0.007
otr6 (dropped)   .103 0.231
otr7 (dropped)   .010 0.901
otr8 (dropped) –.038 0.615
otr9 (dropped)   .196** 0.020
otr10 (dropped)   .087 0.243
size2 (dropped)   .241 0.218
size3 (dropped)   .202 0.302
size4 (dropped)   .213 0.306
priv –.119* 0.070 –.143*** 0.004
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
kred   .074*** 0.001   .068*** 0.000
infl –.015*** 0.000   .008 0.410
t93 –.093*** 0.004   .263* 0.070
t94 –.097*** 0.005   .431** 0.044
t95 –.080** 0.023   .451** 0.036
t96 (dropped)   .572** 0.013
PrS1
PrS2
PrS3
PrS4
cons 1.084*** 0.000 (dropped)
nom (189 categories) F = 1.356 0.003
R – sq R – sq within = 0.0922 R–sq overall = 0.2304
Test statistics for the model F(6.750) = 12.69
Prob > F = 0.000
chi2(19) = 229.36
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 8.42
Prob > chi2 = 0.0037
Hausman specification test chi2(6) = 0.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.9965
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Table C.4 continued from p. 66
Model 1a (csales)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)   .284* 0.065
otr1 (dropped) –.027 0.732
otr2 (dropped)   .332*** 0.000
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)   .420* 0.075
otr5 (dropped) –.182*** 0.007
otr6 (dropped)   .100 0.250
otr7 (dropped)   .007 0.924
otr8 (dropped) –.039 0.613
otr9 (dropped)   .192** 0.024
otr10 (dropped)   .085 0.257
size2 (dropped)   .240 0.224
size3 (dropped)   .201 0.307
size4 (dropped)   .213 0.308
priv –.105 0.142 –.151** 0.011
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
kred   .079*** 0.001   .069*** 0.000
infl –.010** 0.048   .008 0.396
t93 –.029 0.631   .273* 0.064
t94 –.023 0.740   .437** 0.043
t95 –.051 0.301   .431** 0.047
t96 (dropped)   .538** 0.023
PrS1   .020 0.720   .001 0.988
PrS2   .075 0.324   .034 0.601
PrS3   .117 0.234   .054 0.480
PrS4   .146 0.279   .052 0.597
cons   .951*** 0.000 (dropped)
nom (189 categories) F = 1.358 0.003
R – sq R – sq within = 0.0943 R – sq overall = 0.2309
Test statistics for the model F(10.746) = 7.77
Prob > F = 0.000
chi2(23) = 228.38
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 8.50
Prob > chi2 = 0.0036
Hausman specification test chi2(10) = 2.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.9894
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Table C.4 continued from pp 66, 67
Model 2a (csales)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)   .324** 0.033
otr1 (dropped) –.031 0.696
otr2 (dropped)   .339*** 0.000
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)   .412* 0.074
otr5 (dropped) –.205*** 0.002
otr6 (dropped)   .089 0.296
otr7 (dropped)   .010 0.892
otr8 (dropped) –.018 0.815
otr9 (dropped)   .146* 0.081
otr10 (dropped)   .100 0.180
size2 (dropped)   .236 0.222
size3 (dropped)   .197 0.305
size4 (dropped)   .191 0.349
priv
var1   .067 0.475   .046 0.484
var2 –.126* 0.092 –.110* 0.057
leas –.064 0.526 –.107* 0.099
var1a   .017 0.958 –.066 0.614
var2a –.122 0.346 –.183** 0.027
kred   .081*** 0.000   .071*** 0.000
infl –.008* 0.081 –.013*** 0.000
t93 –.022 0.720 –.077 0.134
t94 –.009 0.901 –.060 0.301
t95 –.046 0.348 –.068 0.141
t96 (dropped) (dropped)
PrS1   .012 0.831 –.034 0.511
PrS2   .074 0.327 –.002 0.976
PrS3   .126 0.203   .022 0.773
PrS4   .158 0.240   .018 0.856
cons   .914*** 0.000   .503** 0.038
nom (189 categories) F=1.321 0.006
R – sq R – sq within = 0.1004 R – sq overall = 0.2403
Test statistics for the model F(13.742) = 5.91
Prob > F = 0.000
chi2(27) = 245.11
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 6.79
Prob>chi2 = 0.0092
Hausman specification test chi2(14) = 9.62
Prob > chi2 = 0.7892
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Table C.5. Equation for labour productivity
Model 1 (sempl)
FE regression
Coef. P > |t|
comp (dropped)
otr1 (dropped)
otr2 (dropped)
otr3 (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)
otr5 (dropped)
otr6 (dropped)
otr7 (dropped)
otr8 (dropped)
otr9 (dropped)
otr10 (dropped)
size2 (dropped)
size3 (dropped)
size4 (dropped)
priv   –2854.184 0.832
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
t93 –43816.27*** 0.000
t94 –39555.07*** 0.003
t95 –40066.21*** 0.004
t96 –30679.88** 0.028
PrS1
PrS2
PrS3
PrS4
cons  117046.4*** 0.000
nom (189 categories) F(188,751) = 3.923*** 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.0652
Test statistics for the model F(5.751) = 10.47
Prob > F = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE
Hausman specification test
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Table C.5 continued from p. 69
Model 1a (sempl)
FE regression
Coef. P > |t|
comp (dropped)
otr1 (dropped)
otr2 (dropped)
otr3 (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)
otr5 (dropped)
otr6 (dropped)
otr7 (dropped)
otr8 (dropped)
otr9 (dropped)
otr10 (dropped)
size2 (dropped)
size3 (dropped)
size4 (dropped)
priv   –2199.719 0.881
var1
var2
leas
var1a
var2a
t93 –43872.54*** 0.000
t94 –39242.42** 0.012
t95 –42397.13** 0.030
t96 –33832.25 0.164
PrS1   –1641.455 0.885
PrS2       679.6623 0.965
PrS3     6486.981 0.744
PrS4   –6478.783 0.812
cons  117001.2*** 0.000
nom (189 categories) F(188,747) = 3.841*** 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.0668
Test statistics for the model F(9.747) = 5.94
Prob > F = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE
Hausman specification test
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Table C.5 continued from pp 69, 70
Model 2a (sempl)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)     95680.33 0.166
otr1 (dropped)   –75626.04*** 0.005
otr2 (dropped)   –47734.22 0.066
otr3 (dropped)   206068.7** 0.011
otr4 (dropped) (dropped)
otr5 (dropped)   –86195.42*** 0.000
otr6 (dropped)   –76604.89*** 0.009
otr7 (dropped) –111663.1*** 0.000
otr8 (dropped)   –90669.03*** 0.001
otr9 (dropped)   –117410.3*** 0.000
otr10 (dropped)         3285.913 0.898
size2 (dropped)         9933.414 0.883
size3 (dropped)       –8242.494 0.903
size4 (dropped)       28104.13 0.695
priv
var1   –8234.583 0.668           396.0553 0.980
var2   –6136.949 0.691       16484.61 0.223
leas       349.5765 0.987       16145.79 0.323
var1a    22710.7 0.727       28257.31 0.470
var2a   25580.72 0.335       22155.2 0.298
t93 –43150.95*** 0.000     –56500.87*** 0.000
t94 –38740.45** 0.011     –61790.82*** 0.000
t95 –42301.93** 0.028     –73578.06*** 0.000
t96 –34103.23 0.153     –73585.98*** 0.000
PrS1   –1420.43 0.900         6575.33 0.549
PrS2     1348.319 0.930       17777.33 0.209
PrS3     7474.311 0.709       32591.73* 0.064
PrS4   –5070.442 0.853       28129.57 0.231
cons 116713.1*** 0.000       88200.91 0.348
nom (189 categories) F(188,743) =
3.808***
0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.0693 R – sq overall = 0.2302
Test statistics for the model F(13.743) = 4.26
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(26) = 144.58
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 231.18
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Hausman specification test chi2(13) = 11.71
Prob > chi2 = 0.5518
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Table Ñ.6. Sales equation
Model 3 (lntsal)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)   .2064698 0.557
otr1 (dropped)   .0204024 0.910
otr2 (dropped)   .0170733 0.921
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)   .2043899 0.705
otr5 (dropped) –.5200913*** 0.001
otr6 (dropped)   .3178808 0.106
otr7 (dropped) –.0954752 0.591
otr8 (dropped)   .2676851 0.132
otr9 (dropped) –.5094798*** 0.008
otr10 (dropped) –.0644316 0.708
size2 (dropped)   .5161433 0.252
size3 (dropped)   .4421639 0.325
size4 (dropped)   .5331498 0.264
var1 –.2340698* 0.093 –.2139152* 0.052
var2   .0398088 0.722 –.0312693 0.734
leas   .0743848 0.628   .0100407 0.929
var1a –.0828064 0.868 –.1909694 0.476
var2a   .4396366** 0.025   .3081605** 0.036
ust1   .0098211 0.922   .0034588 0.963
ust2 –.3965718* 0.093 –.3545832 0.108
ust3 –.1082432 0.220 –.1516532** 0.045
ust4 –.0471028 0.622 –.0217027 0.794
ust5 –.1556445 0.197 –.162536 0.112
ust6 –.3435688* 0.058 –.3132079* 0.063
t93 –.4939473*** 0.000 –.457194*** 0.000
t94 –.484876*** 0.000 –.4274739*** 0.000
t95 –.6574689*** 0.000 –.5981265*** 0.000
t96 –.6562588*** 0.000 –.5992811*** 0.000
cons   .0059861 0.895 –.5141955 0.351
nom (189 categories) F(188,741) = 3.041*** 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2384 R – sq overall = 0.3053
Test statistics for the model F(15.741) = 15.46
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(28) = 334.53
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 155.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Hausman specification test chi2(15) = 7.99
Prob > chi2 = 0.9241
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Table C.6 continued from p. 72
Model 4 (lntsal)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)   .2157602 0.543
otr1 (dropped)   .0245101 0.893
otr2 (dropped)   .0181109 0.917
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)   .2148519 0.693
otr5 (dropped) –.5166255*** 0.001
otr6 (dropped)   .3283995* 0.098
otr7 (dropped) –.0935995 0.602
otr8 (dropped)   .2549146 0.154
otr9 (dropped) –.5064539*** 0.009
otr10 (dropped) –.0710699 0.682
size2 (dropped)   .5059154 0.266
size3 (dropped)   .4310403 0.342
size4 (dropped)   .5350107 0.267
var1 –.2601634* 0.066 –.2361231** 0.036
var2   .0345326 0.758 –.0344733 0.708
leas   .0561876 0.715   .003706 0.974
var1a   .002255 0.996 –.1531587 0.568
var2a   .4352516** 0.026   .3044493** 0.039
gol1   .0025255 0.980 –.0002471 0.997
gol2 –.4044338* 0.087 –.3615772 0.101
gol3 –.1307056 0.132 –.1532669** 0.036
gol4 –.1038719 0.247 –.0983373 0.205
gol5 –.1590363 0.281 –.1515315 0.267
gol6   .4462556 0.296   .4582325 0.263
t93 –.4906456*** 0.000 –.454403*** 0.000
t94 –.4706363*** 0.000 –.4196226*** 0.000
t95 –.6328206*** 0.000 –.5807286*** 0.000
t96 –.6373763*** 0.000 –.5860929*** 0.000
cons   .005727 0.900 –.5146531 0.355
nom (189 categories) F(188.741) = 3.066*** 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 2375 R – sq overall = 0.3029
Test statistics for the model F(15.741) = 15.39
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(28) = 331.50
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 161.26
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Hausman specification test chi2(15) = 4.98
Prob > chi2 = 0.9923
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Table Ñ.7. Equation for employment
Model 3 (lntemp)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|z|
comp (dropped) –.1704545 0.291
otr1 (dropped) –.0197843 0.811
otr2 (dropped) –.0486877 0.539
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped) –.1688761 0.494
otr5 (dropped) –.111776 0.113
otr6 (dropped) –.0393265 0.663
otr7 (dropped) –.2055867** 0.012
otr8 (dropped) –.072114 0.377
otr9 (dropped) –.2347343*** 0.008
otr10 (dropped) –.0022263 0.977
size2 (dropped)   .0598855 0.772
size3 (dropped) –.0476078 0.817
size4 (dropped) –.0038635 0.986
var1 –.087592 0.214 –.0854193 0.112
var2 –.0097538 0.864 –.0215163 0.633
leas –.0168352 0.828 –.0275859 0.615
var1a –.0609009 0.809 –.0474096 0.708
var2a   .1158975 0.243   .0922144 0.198
ust1 –.0149081 0.768   .0074497 0.840
ust2 –.1518087 0.205 –.1288654 0.242
ust3 –.0998889** 0.026 –.0881514** 0.019
ust4 –.0460281 0.341 –.0290916 0.480
ust5 –.0565033 0.355 –.0644127 0.204
ust6 –.0332384 0.717 –.0358565 0.670
t93 –.0405364 0.345 –.0351958 0.362
t94 –.1137368** 0.027 –.1114782** 0.012
t95 –.2142052*** 0.000 –.2167577*** 0.000
t96 –.3254389*** 0.000 –.3300831*** 0.000
cons   .008028 0.727   .2600411 0.304
nom (189 categories) F(188.741) = 2.467*** 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2557 R – sq overall = 0.2450
Test statistics for the model F(15.741) = 16.97
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(28) = 305.90
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 98.88
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Hausman specification test chi2(15) = 3.68
Prob > chi2 = 0.9986
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Table C.7 continued from p. 74
Model 4 (lntemp)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)   .0040262 0.985
otr1 (dropped) –.0141977 0.864
otr2 (dropped) –.0467783 0.556
otr3 (dropped)   .1772391 0.475
otr4 (dropped) (dropped)
otr5 (dropped) –.1073106 0.129
otr6 (dropped) –.0344875 0.703
otr7 (dropped) –.2031199** 0.013
otr8 (dropped) –.069843 0.392
otr9 (dropped) –.2319954*** 0.009
otr10 (dropped)   .0001604 0.998
size2 (dropped)   .0571566 0.783
size3 (dropped) –.0507846 0.806
size4 (dropped) –.007037 0.974
var1 –.1000422 0.163 –.0956581* 0.081
var2 –.0079429 0.889 –.0220117 0.626
leas –.0213276 0.784 –.0300115 0.584
var1a –.0669295 0.784 –.0404835 0.749
var2a   .1001985 0.311   .0893398 0.213
gol1 –.018795 0.711   .005602 0.879
gol2 –.1515829 0.206 –.1294523 0.240
gol3 –.099543** 0.024 –.0822033** 0.024
gol4 –.0668676 0.141 –.0577511 0.135
gol5 –.004858 0.948 –.013211 0.846
gol6   .0747924 0.729   .0998045 0.627
t93 –.0393211 0.359 –.03327 0.388
t94 –.1106734** 0.032 –.1097406** 0.013
t95 –.2081892*** 0.000 –.2124395*** 0.000
t96 –.3203224*** 0.000 –.3267203*** 0.000
cons   .0100667 0.661   .0861328 0.765
nom (189 categories) F(188.741) = 2.483*** 0.000
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2565 R – sq overall = 0.2439
Test statistics for the model F(15.741) = 17.04
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(28) = 305.87
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 100.83
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Hausman specification test chi2(15) = 3.52
Prob > chi2 = 0.9989
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Table Ñ.8. Equation for profit margin and productivity of labour
Model 3a (marg)
FE regression
Coef. P>|t|
comp (dropped)
otr1 (dropped)
otr2 (dropped)
otr3 (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)
otr5 (dropped)
otr6 (dropped)
otr7 (dropped)
otr8 (dropped)
otr9 (dropped)
otr10 (dropped)
size2 (dropped)
size3 (dropped)
size4 (dropped)
var1 –.027 0.872
var2 –.006 0.963
leas –.037 0.839
var1a   .068 0.905
var2a –.025 0.914
ust1 –.092 0.452
ust2   .027 0.922
ust3 –.191* 0.073
ust4 –.233** 0.040
ust5 –.139 0.326
ust6 –.149 0.472
PrS1 –.060 0.549
PrS2 –.084 0.548
PrS3 –.214 0.239
PrS4 –.313 0.196
t93   .107 0.319
t94   .129 0.291
t95   .229*** 0.008
t96 (dropped)
infl   .008 0.339
kred –.548*** 0.000
cons   .285 0.198
nom (189 categories) F(188.736)  = 1.349*** 0.004
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2823
Test statistics for the model F(20.736) = 14.47
Prob > F = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE
Hausman specification test
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Table C.8 continued from p. 76
Model 4a (marg)
FE regression
Coef. P>|t|
comp (dropped)
otr1 (dropped)
otr2 (dropped)
otr3 (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)
otr5 (dropped)
otr6 (dropped)
otr7 (dropped)
otr8 (dropped)
otr9 (dropped)
otr10 (dropped)
size2 (dropped)
size3 (dropped)
size4 (dropped)
var1 –.046 0.783
var2 –.005 0.970
leas –.045 0.805
var1a –.020 0.972
var2a –.037 0.871
gol1 –.101 0.410
gol2   .030 0.913
gol3 –.217** 0.038
gol4 –.198* 0.064
gol5 –.125 0.459
gol6   .142 0.772
PrS1 –.059 0.558
PrS2 –.075 0.594
PrS3 –.198 0.276
PrS4 –.291 0.229
t93   .112 0.297
t94   .139 0.253
t95   .238*** 0.006
t96 (dropped)
infl   .008 0.320
kred –.548*** 0.000
cons   .281 0.202
nom (189 categories) F(188.736)  = 1.347*** 0.004
R – sq R – sq within = 0.2825
Test statistics for the model F(20.736) = 14.49
Prob > F = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE
Hausman specification test
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Table C.8 continued from pp 76, 77
Model 4a (sempl)
RE regression
Coef. P>|z|
comp –111735.6** 0.038
otr1   –76350.4*** 0.005
otr2   –47649.1* 0.067
otr3 (dropped)
otr4 –201836.1** 0.013
otr5   –85788.25*** 0.000
otr6    –77192.35*** 0.009
otr7 –112949.6*** 0.000
otr8   –91039.99*** 0.001
otr9 –117797.3*** 0.000
otr10       2888.581 0.911
size2       8848.163 0.896
size3     –9478.288 0.888
size4     26728.98 0.710
var1         491.4135 0.977
var2      15720.22 0.255
leas      19017.01 0.254
var1a       28260.3 0.471
var2a      23862.78 0.267
gol1         361.1366 0.974
gol2      17692.58 0.563
gol3       7941.429 0.452
gol4       5775.755 0.600
gol5       –9215.949 0.625
gol6       39084.13 0.491
PrS1         4686 0.678
PrS2        15192.49 0.310
PrS3      30707.95* 0.098
PrS4      25353.94 0.299
t93    –56036.39*** 0.000
t94    –63177.72*** 0.000
t95    –74896.14*** 0.000
t96    –73782.58*** 0.000
infl
kred
cons    294458.2*** 0.000
nom (189 categories)
R – sq R – sq overall = 0.2329
Test statistics for the model chi2(32)  = 146.08
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 223.19
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Hausman specification test chi2(19) = 24.54
Prob>chi2 = 0.1761
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Table Ñ.9. Equation for costs per unit
Model 3 (csales)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped) –.091 0.651
otr1 (dropped) –.041 0.603
otr2 (dropped)   .332*** 0.000
otr3 (dropped) –.414* 0.079
otr4 (dropped) (dropped)
otr5 (dropped) –.221*** 0.001
otr6 (dropped)   .074 0.394
otr7 (dropped)   .000 0.997
otr8 (dropped) –.029 0.713
otr9 (dropped)   .141* 0.099
otr10 (dropped)   .110 0.151
size2 (dropped)   .249 0.206
size3 (dropped)   .213 0.278
size4 (dropped)   .208 0.318
var1   .038 0.675   .040 0.512
var2 –.170** 0.021 –.120** 0.021
leas –.054 0.592 –.109* 0.086
var1a –.233 0.474 –.103 0.431
var2a –.160 0.213 –.192** 0.017
ust1   .093 0.158 –.012 0.792
ust2   .023 0.881 –.033 0.810
ust3   .023 0.691 –.025 0.584
ust4   .183*** 0.004   .105** 0.036
ust5 –.121 0.125 –.133** 0.029
ust6   .097 0.415   .039 0.708
kred   .080*** 0.000   .070*** 0.000
infl –.012*** 0.000 –.014*** 0.000
t93 –.068* 0.084 –.105*** 0.003
t94 –.072* 0.070 –.101*** 0.006
t95 –.076** 0.034 –.085** 0.016
t96 (dropped) (dropped)
cons   1.001*** 0.000   .949*** 0.001
nom (189 categories) F(188.740)  = 1.355*** 0.003
R – sq R – sq within = 0.1179 R – sq overall = 0.2496
Test statistics for the model F(16.740) = 6.18
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(29) = 253.38
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 7.64
Prob > chi2 = 0.0057
Hausman specification test chi2(16) = 8.35
Prob > chi2 = 0.9379
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Table C.9 continued from p. 79
Model 4 (csales)
FE regression RE regression
Coef. P > |t| Coef. P > |z|
comp (dropped)   .327** 0.033
otr1 (dropped) –.029 0.714
otr2 (dropped)   .340*** 0.000
otr3 (dropped) (dropped)
otr4 (dropped)   .416* 0.076
otr5 (dropped) –.203*** 0.003
otr6 (dropped)   .086 0.317
otr7 (dropped)   .019 0.803
otr8 (dropped) –.017 0.831
otr9 (dropped)   .149* 0.078
otr10 (dropped)   .097 0.202
size2 (dropped)   .248 0.204
size3 (dropped)   .210 0.281
size4 (dropped)   .207 0.318
var1   .042 0.651   .035 0.569
var2 –.162** 0.029 –.117** 0.024
leas –.039 0.698 –.106* 0.097
var1a   .089 0.780 –.082 0.526
var2a –.130 0.312 –.191** 0.018
gol1   .100 0.132 –.011 0.798
gol2   .010 0.946 –.035 0.799
gol3   .051 0.377 –.013 0.767
gol4   .110* 0.062   .037 0.428
gol5 –.051 0.597 –.044 0.605
gol6 –.123 0.660 –.295 0.256
kred   .080*** 0.000   .070*** 0.000
infl –.012*** 0.000 –.014*** 0.000
t93 –.058 0.145 –.099*** 0.006
t94 –.072* 0.070 –.102*** 0.006
t95 –.080** 0.027 –.087** 0.015
t96 (dropped) (dropped)
cons   .977*** 0.000   .520** 0.032
nom (189 categories) F(188.740)  = 1.331*** 0.005
R – sq R – sq within = 0.1047 R – sq overall = 0.2419
Test statistics for the model F(16.740) = 5.41
Prob > F = 0.0000
chi2(29) = 243.39
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
BPL multiplier test for RE chi2(1) = 6.46
Prob > chi2 = 0.0110
Hausman specification test chi2(16) = 10.69
Prob > chi2 = 0.8279
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